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Vern Krishna*

Taxation of Personal
Injury Awards:
A Wiry Methuselah

I. Introduction
The income tax status of damage awards in personal injury actions
assumes greater importance as litigation in this area increases and
the monetary value of judgments and settlements escalates. If the
United States experience has any predictive value for Canadian
trends, the statistics are ominous indeed. During the last decade
alone, medical malpractice cases, which represent but one segment
of personal injury actions, have witnessed an increase in the average
quantum of damages from $62,151 to $350,000, while the total
payout in New York State went from $1.4 million to $17 million. 1
If, as Street had commented, ". . . the importance of a topic is
to be judged by the number of writs issued, then actions for personal
injuries are as important as any legal topic today..."2 - perhaps
more so in 1976 than in 1962 when the observation was made.
At the same time, the doctrinal treatment of tax considerations
differs markedly between Canadian, English and American
jurisdictions. In Canada, since the Supreme Court's decision in R.
v. Jennings,3 a judicial tribunal is not required to account for
income tax factors in the determination of the quantum of damages
in such actions. The Court reasoned that compensation in personal
injury actions replaced impaired capacity rather than earnings, and
was perturbed by the pragmatic hurdles to a deliberative
consideration of tax factors. Further, whether or not the right to sue
for damages for personal injury constitutes a "chose in action" and
therefore "property" under the capital gains provisions has not
4
been settled.
*Vern Krishna, Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
The author is indebted to Professors William D. Andrews, Harvard Law School,
and Edwin C. Harris, Dalhousie Law Faculty for comments and suggestions on
earlier drafts.
1. "The Doctors' New Dilemma", Newsweek, February 10, 1975.
2. H. Street, Principlesof the Law of Damages (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
1962) at43.
3. R. v. Jennings, (1966] S.C.R. 532; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644, affig (sub nom.
Jennings v. Cronsberry) [1965] 20.R. 285; 50 D.L.R. (2d) 385 (C.A.).
4 Compare McCormack v. Toronto R. W. Co. (1907), 13 O.L.R. 656 (D.C.) and
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The English, in direct contrast, consider income tax factors in
assessing the quantum of an award, on the authority of the House of
Lords in BTC v. Gourley, 5 on the premise that a component element
of such awards represents a substitution for lost earnings, which
would normally be taxable. The American stance, which
chronologically preceded both the Canadian and English resolutions, favours non-taxation, but achieves this objective by virtue of
a statutory provision, supposedly founded on a replacement of
capital argument. 6 However, although the Code specifically
exempts such awards from taxation, the consideration of income tax
factors in assessing the quantum of an award has found a varied
7
response in the American courts.
These differences provide cause for concern; for while every
jurisdiction is sovereign in enacting its taxing statutes, concepts
such as income and damage theory have, at least, a common lineage
in the common law world. The purpose of this paper is to examine
these differences in both the tax treatment of damage awards in
personal injury actions and the consideration of income tax factors
in assessing the quantum of such awards. 8 It is suggested that part of
the confusion results from a myopic view of income tax as a
separate and distinct branch of the law, isolated from all other
segments of law. The problem was considered by both the English
and Scottish Law Reform Committees, 9 which failed, however, to
reach any conclusion, and suggested further review in the future.
Again, academic writers have tended to concentrate on the
pragmatic rather than the conceptual hurdles encountered, and have
focused on isolated pockets. ' 0 The problem is further aggravated by
the tendency of most decisions to state the result rather than to
Re Hollister (1926), 30 O.W.N. 328 (Bankruptcy Ct.) with Curtis v. Wilcox,
[194812 K.B. 474 (C.A.) andDiGuilov. Boland(1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 510 (Ont.

C.A.).
5. [1956] A.C. 185; [1956]2 W.L.R. 41; [1955] 3 All E.R. 796 (H.L.).
6. Section 104, InternalRevenue Code. The long history of departmental rulings
holding personal injury recoveries non-taxable, on the theory that they roughly
correspond to a return of capital, may be found in: 2 Cum. Bull. 71; 1-1 Cum. Bull.
92, 93; VII-2 Cum. Bull. 123; 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179, 180.
7. Infra at 418 et seq.

8. In this paper the use of the phrase "tax treatment of damage awards" is
intended to apply to application of taxes by the appropriate administrative agency,
e.g. DN.R in Canada. The phrase "tax factors" refers to the consideration of taxes
by the court in assessing damages.
9. The English Law Reform Committee, 7th Report (1958; Cmnd. 501); the
Scottish Law Reform Committee 6th Report (1959; Cmnd. 635).
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address the underlying conceptual issue of whether the damage
award, or any part thereof, represents compensation for capacity or
loss of earnings. Throw into the pot terminological licence to
interchange descriptive titles, and one is left with a stew of
incongruous conclusions. 1 1
The approach adopted in this paper is a search for a satisfactory
resolution, which necessitates an analysis on a conceptual plane of
the theories of income and damages, and a reconciliation of these
theories with the articulated objectives of a tax system. Pragmatic
and administrative considerations which influence any tax system
are then considered on the basis of the conceptual foundation.
Hence, the initial examination focuses on the theory of income and
the objectives of a tax structure, whence it proceeds to an analysis of
the underlying precepts of damage determination. Finally, upon
analysis of these foundations, the focus shifts to specific proposals
for the pragmatic integration of these segments in the Canadian
context.
In devising the specific proposals for reform, the emphasis
remains on conceptual integration, with any necessary sacrifices
dictated by pragmatic considerations being confined to the essential
minimum. Thus, the underlying philosophy is that conceptual purity
should only be sacrificed after a rigorous evaluation of the reasons
necessitating the sacrifice, with consciousness of the resultant costs
and the corresponding benefits derived. While the scope of the topic
discussed in the pages following is relatively narrow; the
expectation is that the overall approach may serve some wider
purpose in Canadian tax circles. Hence at one level, the
methodology of the analysis presented may have application in
actions for wrongful dismissal, invasion of privacy, strike pay and
the treatment of collateral income and benefits. Questions as to
whether payments for wrongful dismissal constitute income
10. G. Dworkin, Damages and Tax -A
Rev. 315 at 320:

Comparative Survey, [19671 Bri. Tax

...In order to analyze these matters properly it would be necessary to examine
all the cases dealing with the taxation of compensation awards and also to
embark on the wider problems of capital and income. That is beyond the scope
of this article ....
11. The terminology employed to express notions of capacity and earnings is
extensive. Phrases such as "impaired capacity", "capital asset", "replacement of
capital", "loss of earning capacity", "loss of earnings", "capacity to earn" are
illustrative of judicial usage.
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continue to elicit responses predicated on the form of drafting,
rather than on any conceptual foundations. 12 On a broader spectrum
issues of conceptual tax development, equity and sacrifices to
administrative convenience and simplicity are constantly recurring
problems.
II. Theory of Taxation
In attempting this conceptual reconciliation, one may start with an
examination of the theory of taxation. The expos6 of this theory
may be enhanced if two aspects are segregated and analyzed
distinctly. On the one hand is the question of the objectives of a tax
structure. On the other hand, there are issues which relate to the
concept of income. Taken together, the two should amalgamate into
a cohesive theory of taxation. The problem, however, is not one that
is merely restricted to the development of a theory of taxation, but is
influenced by one's attitude toward that theory. Hence, it is
suggested in this context, that one should start with the concept of
an "ideal" structure and examine its underlying purpose to extract
its raison d'tre. At a later stage one may compromise this "ideal"
structure in the interests of pragmatic necessity, recognizing that we
depart from the ideal at a cost of conceptual purity, in order to
receive in return efficiency of administration and the efficacy of
implementation which represent benefits. Thus, here as elsewhere
in this paper, the task is to develop a theory with conceptual purity,
and at a later juncture to sacrifice a part of this purity, which
sacrifice involves a cost or detriment, in order to enhance
administrative convenience which implies a benefit. At all stages,
then, it remains important to evaluate the relative cost (detriment)
involved in the sacrifice and the resulting benefit derived from that
sacrifice.
1. Objectives of a Tax Structure
In order to evaluate the various and oft times conflicting objectives
of a tax structure and determine the relative weight to be assigned to
conflicting objectives, one may ask: Why have an income tax at all?
For in the answer to this question lies embedded the solution as to
the weight which should be attributed to conflicting objectives. It is
12. Compare R. v. Atkins, [1975] C.T.C. 377 (F.C., T.D.), affd (1976), 76
D.T.C. 6258 (F.C.A.) with Quance v. The Queen, [1974] C.T.C. 225; 74 D.T.C.
6210 (F.C., T.D.).
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submitted that the answer to the question posed is not the raising of
revenue as being the primary objective of a tax system. For, as the
Carter Commission 13 observed, if that were the primary objective,
any government might, in order to raise revenue, resort to
commandeering resources. This technique, howevier, would usually
be inefficient if done fairly, and otherwise tend towards capricious
results. Alternatively, the government could create money. Such a
route would, however, tend to inflame inflation if done without any
increase in national output, when all resources were productively
employed. The consequences of this method would be to penalize
those residents who were on fixed income and cause them to carry a
disproportionate burden.
To thwart the possibilities of such adverse consequences, a
government might resort to compulsory payments as a means of
transferring resources from private to public hands, a system
otherwise known as taxation. Within this generic category,
however, are available several diverse forms of taxation, each
method attended by different consequences. Thus, a property tax
may penalize only one segment of society for benefits provided to
all. A sales tax-may have the effect of unduly burdening those at the
lower income levels, who proportionately are required to consume a
larger percentage of their income, thereby in effect becoming a tax
on consumption.
A further alternative, and the one adopted by the three
jurisdictions which are within the concern of this paper, is the
implementation of an income tax. Although an income tax presents
possibilities of the tax being shifted down into the price of goods,
such taxes can at least reflect an equitable intention. As the Carter
Commission observed:
...if a government had to choose one method to the exclusion
of all other methods, taxation would be preferable because it can
be more equitable, can be less disruptive to the economy, and
can give the government more effective control over the total
demand for goods and services [emphasis in original text]. 14
Again, in discussing the objectives of a tax structure, the
Commission cited, inter alia, the maximization of current and
future output of goods and services, and "...[t]o
ensure that this
13. 2 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1966) at 2 - "Carter Report" [hereinafter "Carter Report"].
14. Id. at4.
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flow of goods and services is distributed equitably among
individuals or groups ..

."15

The recognition of the importance of equity as a determinant of a
"good" tax structure is certainly not a novel suggestion, though as
an objective it suffers from a remarkable propensity towards
asphyxiation by tax legislation. Adam Smith early supported the
notion of taxation according to ability to pay, and the importance of
equity in taxation, when he postulated:
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the
support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to
their several abilities . . . In the observation or neglect of this

maxim consists the equality or inequality of taxation. 16

In a similar vein these sentiments were echoed by the Carter
Commission in its comprehensive review of the Canadian tax
structure. In directing its attention to the issue of the approach
towards equity in tax structures, the Commission recommended that
"..

. the government must seek to impose progressive marginal tax

rates on all additions to personal economic power, without regardto
the source of those increments in power . . . It should also be a goal

of the tax system to avoid tax concessions to particular industries
and to particular kinds of income .

. . . "[emphasis

added].17

However, as will be demonstrated later, the imposition of a
marginal rate progressively linked to income levels, designed as a
vehicle to achieve equity, may result in inequitable results if
indiscriminately applied and without the implementation of special
ameliorating provisions.
In addition to the objectives of equity and revenue generation,
several other objectives have their influence within an "ideal" tax
structure. Hence, in order to facilitate the implementation of the
system it is desirable to minimize the administrative problems and
the associated costs of collection. Every tax ought to be such that its
cost of collection may be reasonable. This objective is implemented
by the imposition of a "simple" tax system, one designed to
minimize the problems associated with measurement and quantification. The influence of this objective may be seen in the selection of
a calendar year as the yardstick for the measurement of income.
Any conceptual definition of income in terms of accretion of wealth
15. Id. at7.
16. Graham, ed., The Synthetic Wealth ofNations at 282.
17. Supra, note 13 at 10- 11.
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must be tempered with the associated problems of measurement in
accounting. As Dickinson has commented:
Inasmuch ... as the ultimate realization of the original
investment is from the nature of things deferred for a long period
of years, during which partial realizations are continually taking
place, it becomes necessary to fall back on estimates of value at
certain definite periods, and to consider as profit and loss the
estimated increase or decrease between any two such periods. Is
Inherent in the selection of an accounting period such as a calendar
year, and the concept of realization, is the recognition of a sacrifice
of conceptual purity in the definition of income in favour of an
enhancement of administrative simplicity. 19
Given these diverse objectives of an "ideal" tax structure,
conflict is inevitable and compromise becomes imperative. In
evaluating conflicting objectives and the relative weight to be
assigned to each, one is compelled - indeed it is inescapable - to
reflect value judgments premised on some explicit or implicit.
ideology. The leaning of this writer is that equity should play a
pre-eminent role within the structure, given that the existence of the
structure itself presupposes the need for revenue generation, and
that this latter objective is implicitly recognized once a tax system is
20
brought into existence.
2. StructuralFoundationofIncome Tax
In part the definitional problem of identifying income is inextricably
linked with the problem of identifying the objectives of a tax
structure. The interdependence of the conceptual notion of income
with the objectives of a tax structure combine to answer the
question: What is income? Hence, Simons in his classic work
18. A.L. Dickinson, Accounting Practice and Procedure (New York: Ronald
Press Co., 1918) at 67.
19. Other objectives cited for an ideal tax structure include the need for certainty
and convenience. Further, a taxing statute may be used as a vehicle of
socio-economic policy. Illustrations founded on socio-economic policy, as opposed
to the structural concept of income, may be seen in s. 38 (capital gains taxed at half
rates in effect); s. I10 (1) (a) (deductions pertaining to charitable donations); s. 63
(child care deductions); s. 20 (1) (a) (accelerated capital cost allowances); s. 125 (1)
(small business deductions for CCPC); all in the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970- 71 72, c. 63.
20. A similar emphasis was adopted by the Carter Commission. "...[W]e are
convinced that unless this objective i.e. equity is achieved to a high degree all other
achievements are of little account .... ", 2 Carter Report, supra, note 13 at 17.
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embarks on the definitional problem with explicit assumptions in
regard to the objectives of a tax structure, and emphasizes the role
of equity:
. . . Income taxation is broadly an instrument of economic
control, a means of mitigating economic inequality . . . . We
shall assume the moderation of inequality is an important
objective of policy and proceed to consider income taxes as
devices for effecting it ....21
In a sense then, it may be suggested that the sine qua non of
"income" as a definitional term is the presupposition of the
desirability of equity. As Simons puts it: ". . . Since it is widely
agreed that income is a good tax base, its meaning may be sought by
inquiring what definition would provide the basis for most nearly
equitable levies .... ,"22
Given his explicit acceptance of equity, he proceeds on the
premise that any concept of income should satisfy the requirements
of objectivity and quantifiability: ". . . It must be measurable;
indeed, definition must indicate or clearly imply an actual procedure
of measuring .... ,,23 While such requirements may not be
conceptually necessary in any abstract sense, it is difficult to fault
his pragmatic premise. Proceeding on the foundation of the above,
he suggests a concept of income related to the accumulation and/or
consumption of wealth over some period of time. In conventional
mathematical symbolism:
I = Wt , I + C - Wt

(Where

I = income during a period
of time
C = the market value of
rights exercised in
consumption
W = person's store of
property rights
t = appropriate time interval)

U. of Chicago Press, 1938)
21. H. Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation (Chi., III.:
at41.
22. Id. at 42.
23. Id.
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In this context then, the span assigned to "t" may range from a day
to a lifetime, with the resolution dependent upon pragmatic rather
than conceptual considerations. The essence of the concept is
thereby reduced to gain during an interval of time -".

.

. The sine

qua non of income is gain, as our Courts have recognized in their
more lucid moments - and gain to someone during a specific time
interval ....*"24
Other classical definitions of income, albeit not identical, have
pursued a similar path and aligned themselves with the concept of
the creation of wealth. Thus, Haig conceptualized income as "...
the money value of the net accretion of economic power between
two points in time ....,,25 So also Fisher conceived of income as
,26 Again,
". .. a flow of benefits during a period of time .. '..
imputed
include
should
income
that
Marshall, when he observed
income, preferred the all-inclusionary approach - "For scientific
when occuring
purposes, it would be best if the word 'income'
27
alone should always mean total real income."
Several observations may be extracted from these views of
income as formulated by the classical economists:
(i) there is conceptual similarity, if not identical concordance,
in the views of these various economists, defining income
as an accretion to wealth, whether it be in terms of benefits
received, a flow of satisfactions or the inclusion of imputed
income;
(ii) the time interval "t" is left open in any definition of the
concept of income. At its maximum it would include a
lifetime;
(iii) no mention or emphasis is placed on the notion of
realization of benefits in order for its inclusion into the
embrace of income.
Notwithstanding the inherent appeal of conceptual purity, one
recognizes the pragmatic limitations generated in the implementation of a "pure" doctrine from an administrative viewpoint. Any
such doctrine must be capable of withstanding the rigorous test of
day-to-day administration by the taxing authorities and judicial
24. Id. at 50.
25. R. Haig, The Concept of Income, The Federal Income Tax (Columbia U.
Lectures: Columbia U. Press, 1920).
26. I. Fisher, Elementary Principlesof Economics (New York: Macmillan, 1919)
at 60.
27. A. Marshall, Economics ofIndustry (London: Macmillan & Co., 1893) at 67.
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determination resulting from inevitable conflict situations. One may
echo the sentiments of the Carter Commission that the problem is
maintains
thereby reduced to one of specifying a tax base that ".
the integrity of the concept without creating insuperable administra28
tive difficulties ....
These administrative and pragmatic hurdles were not unknown to
the earlier classical writers. Simons himself was not unaware of the
problems inherent in his definition when he asked where the line
was to be drawn between economic and non-economic activity. In
this context, Kleinwichter posed a few interesting conundrums:
(i) Do families have larger incomes because parents give
competent instruction to children instead of paying for
institutional training? Does a doctor have relatively large
income in years when his family requires and receives an
extraordinary amount of his own professional services?
If such amounts were included, we might be able to
demonstrate that poverty level families actually had
substantial incomes if account were taken of necessary
services internally performed rather than externally purchased.
(ii) What of the problem of leisure? Is leisure, beyond a certain
minimum, itself an item of consumption? As Kleinwichter
noted". . . A little reflection along these lines suggests that
leisure is itself a major item of consumption; that income
per hour of leisure, beyond a certain minimum, might well
be imputed to persons according to what they might earn per
hour if otherwise engaged. .... "
how
(iii) What of compensation in kind? Here he asked "...
would one measure the relative incomes of an ordinary
officer serving with his troops and a Fliigeladjutantto the
sovereign? Both receive the same nominal pay; but the latter
receives quarters in the palace, food *at the royal table,
servants, and horses for sports. He accompanies the prince
to the theatre and opera, and, in general, lives royally at no
expense to himself and is able to save generously from his
salary. Then again, suppose the Fliigeladjutant detests
opera and hunting .... 29
Such problems, while they detract from the administrative
feasibility of enforcement, are inherent in the "economic power"
concept of income. However, they are not completely and totally
insuperable, as was demonstrated by the Carter Commission in its
28. 3 Carter Report, supra, note 13 at 22.
29. Kleinwiichter, Das Einkommen und Seine Verteilung (1896) at 1-16.
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formulation of a "comprehensive tax base". The problem then may
be reduced to a dual dimensional conflict. At one level there is the
conflict between the various objectives of a tax system, with
particular tension between equity on the one hand and simplicity
and administrative feasibility on the other. On another level, there is
the conflict of conceptual purity in a doctrine of income, which
stands at the core of the structure, and the necessity for simplicity
and administrative convenience. The question becomes: How much
impurity will we permit in the interests of pragmatic necessity and
the pursuit of administrative convenience, and still remain within
the realm of an equitable tax structure?
Before answering this question, it may serve some useful purpose
to examine some major concessions made to administrative
considerations, and presently embodied within the Canadian tax
system. One such concession is the concept of realization. Thus a
gain is not subject to taxation until the gain has been realized. The
rationale for this rule is not that there has been no income generated
in any economic sense, but rather because of the difficulty of
valuation without a market transaction. 30 The economic concept of
income as an accretion to wealth is thus diluted in favour of
administrative necessity. Again, imputed income, e.g. from the
imputed rent on an owner-occupied residence, is not brought into
the computation of income, not because of any rationale inherent in
the definition of income but again in deference to problems of
valuation and administration. Similar reasons may justify the
exclusion of various benefits observed in Kleinw~ichter's conundrums.
When one turns to the choice of an appropriate time interval,
denoted by "t" in Simons' formulation of income, similar
considerations prevail. The choice of a calendar year for the
determination of the tax liability of an individual is premised on an
artificial but convenient time horizon. While the accretion of wealth
may occur over a shorter or longer period of time, it is considered
convenient that an individual report his tax liability at discreet
intervals of one year. This concession, coupled with the realization
concept, results in the individual being liable for income gains
30. Section 5, Income Tax Act taxes income received. Section 38 requires a
disposition for a capital gain or loss transaction. Problems of valuation do not
explain the exclusion of unrealized gains where there is an active securities market,
which permits accurate valuation. To explain exclusion in these circumstances,
resort must be made to political and economic considerations.
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realized during the calendar year. However, the cost of these
concessions, made in the interests of administration, is the resultant
sacrifice of equity, by permitting others to defer their unrealized
gains, which would otherwise be included in an economic concept
of income.
Each of the above-mentioned concessions, viz. realization,
exclusion of imputed income, and the choice of the calendar year, is
made from an administrative or other definitely specified objective,
such as simplicity or socio-economic policy considerations. It is
important then to realize, and for the courts and the taxing
authorities to bear in mind, that when departure is called for from
this economic concept of income, it is done for a specific purpose,
and not because of an inadequacy of the concept itself, and that such
departures are not justifiable when no specific benefit accrues which
demonstrably outweighs the resulting cost of conceptual sacrifice of
a fundamentally sound doctrine. Articulation of the rationale for
departure from the concept becomes imperative.
Further, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of income
is an economic concept, which has been modified by accountants
and lawyers to meet the demands of specific situations, such as the
requirements of a discreet and periodic time interval for financial
reporting purposes, or the desirability of a market exchange
transaction to enhance objectivity in financial statements.
The answer suggested in this paper to the question earlier posited
about the necessary sacrifice of purity in favour of administrative
convenience, is that the sacrifice of purity of the concept of income
should be no greater than the minimum required to implement the
proposal on an administratively feasible and cost conscious basis.
Any sacrifice in excess of this minimum endangers equity as a
primary objective of the tax structure, with no corresponding
countervailing benefit. Hence, it is suggested that the following
three questions should determine the tax treatment of damage
awards:
(i) Does the damage award or any part thereof result in an
improvement in the economic power of an individual,
capable of objective measurement and quantification? If the
answer is in the affirmative, then primafacie that portion of
the award which causes the improvement in the economic
power of the individual should be included in income,
subject to the questions below:
(ii) Is it justifiable to treat the damage award in some special
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manner, due to the existence of particular circumstances
surrounding its receipt which dictate its exclusion from
income?
(iii) What will be the price paid by the tax structure in the event
of exclusion from income, and with what resulting benefits?
Unless the answers to the questions (ii) and (iii) produce a
convincing rationale in favour of exclusion from income,
the prima facie assumption of the first question should
apply and the relevant portion of the damage award should
be included in 31income, at least from the standpoint of an
income theory.
The distinguishing characteristics of the above suggested approach
are at once its emphasis on equity as being a desirable and the
primary objective of a tax structure, and a broad inclusionary
concept of income premised on an accretion to wealth foundation.
As Haig has observed:
• . . It is very undesirable from the point of view of economics
and equity that the judicial definition of income should develop
along narrow lines by the process of definitely eliminating from
the concept certain items as not being income .... 32
The analysis following endeavours to analyze the character of a
personal injury damage award in the context of the above discussed
theory of income and taxation.
3. DamageAwards in the Context ofIncome Theory
The problem of identifying the nature of a personal injury damage
award in order to determine its characterization as being an income
item or in the nature of replacement of capital or some other form of
hybrid is magnified by terminological misuse. As Street observes:
Close scrutiny of Lloyd's List Law Reports, which report those
parts of judgments dealing with damages more fully than any
other series, reveals that the courts use the expressions "loss of
indiscriminately,
earnings" and "loss of earning capacity" quite
33
as if nothing would depend on their choice.
3 1. The suggested approach in this paper is that only a portion of the total damage
award should be subject to taxation. This portion will relate to the earnings
component of the total award, as being embraced by the concept of income, and
will exclude that portion of the award which relates to the loss of amenities of life,
pain and suffering, etc.. The rationale for this approach is explained infra
at 405 et seq.
32. Supra, note 25 at 27.
33. Supra, note 2 at 47.
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This verbal misuse of phrases such as "loss of earnings" and "loss
of earning capacity", together with the indiscriminate interchange
of phrases such as "impaired earning capacity" and "replacement
of capital" results, in part, from a lack of appreciation of the
underlying theoretical premise. However, two major and diametrically opposed schools of thought emerge from the judgments and
the literature in this subject area. On the one hand, there are those
who suggest that a personal injury damage award represents
replacement of a loss of earning capacity. This group may be
categorized as the "capital asset" school, which favours nontaxation of any portion of the damage award recovered by the
plaintiff, on the theory that such awards compensate for a loss of
capacity or a capital asset, such items being considered non-taxable.
At the present time, this view prevails judicially in Canada by virtue
of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Jennings. As Judson J.
observed in his judgment: ".

.

. In a case of personal injuries, what

the plaintiff has lost is the whole or part, as the case may be, of his
natural equipment . . . . 34 The United States has achieved the
same result through statutory enactment of s. 104 of the Internal
Revenue Code. On the other hand, there are those who favour the
view that any such compensation received by the injured plaintiff
represents in part at least a replacement of loss of earnings per se both past and future - as opposed to earning capacity. This latter
school argues that a portion of the plaintiffs damage award is
granted "in lieu" of actual or potential earnings lost and may be
characterized as the "substitution" school. This group would
favour the taxation of that segment of the award relating to past and
future earnings loss. However, differences of opinion exist within
this latter group as to the mode of accounting for the tax element.
The English, by virtue of the House of Lords' decision in
Gourley, 3 5 adopted the approach that the judicial tribunal should
adjust for tax factors, and reduced the plaintiffs pre-tax damage
award of £37,720 (the portion relating to earnings only) to an
after-tax amount of £ 6695. The thesis of this writer, for reasons
explained later in this paper, is in favour of the Department of
National Revenue taxing the appropriate portion of the plaintiff's
36
award, on the authority of statutory enactment.
34. Supra, note 3 at 655.
35. Supra, note 5.
36. Infra, at 425 et seq.
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If the capital asset theory is accepted, then it may be asked: What
is the value of the capital asset that is being replaced? The answer
would call for valuation of the capital asset as being the equivalent
of the present value of future cash flows which are being
compensated, at some specified rate of return. This method of
capital asset valuation has wide application in other areas, e.g.
where the capitalized value of an enterprise is computed for
purposes of a sale transaction, the anticipated earnings flow may be
discounted to their present value, in accordance with some specified
rate of return; again the value of a bond is obtained by discounting
the future interest payments plus the deferred payment of the
principal sum, at the prevailing market rate of interest. The
problem, however, in the context of personal injury damage
awards, is to determine the underlying assumptions to which the
method of valuation may be applied. Should the injured plaintiff
have the capital sum of his compensation computed on the premise
that he will or will not be required to erode his principal? The
dilemma may be illustrated by examining the alternative techniques
of computation premised on the two alternatives above mentioned.
For the purpose of these computations, it is assumed that the
plaintiff is injured in 19-0; trial of the action for damages is
concluded by 19-2, at which trial expert testimony is adduced to
show that the plaintiff shall have fully recovered by 19-5. His loss
of earnings is established at $1000 per annum, and the prevailing
interest rate is 5%.37
(a). No Erosion of CapitalRequired
Assuming that the purpose of any damage award recovered by the
plaintiff is to compensate him for his pecuniary loss, in addition to
any pain and suffering and medical expenses expended or to be
expended, this plaintiff would need to recover that sum of money
which would restore to him the $1000 annual loss suffered by him
as a result of the assumed liability of the defendant. The plaintiff
would establish loss as follows: 38
37. The choice of a rate of interest may prove to be contentious. Options available
are, inter alia, the prevailing prime rate at the date of trial, the yield rate of
gilt-edge securities, the rate applicable to trustee investments. The selection of any
of the above rates will provide a conceptually better result than the result which will
be obtained by ignoring the discount factor entirely. Consideration of the selection
of the "ideal" rate of interest is beyond the scope of this paper.
38. The theory and purpose of damage awards is considered infra at 408 et seq. At
this juncture it is assumed that compensation is the primary objective.

400 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Past Earnings Lost ................................
Future Earnings Sacrificed (Estimated) ................

$2000
$3000

Presumably the plaintiff would be awarded $2000 for his actual past
earnings loss, established as special damages. 3 9 Assuming that he is
not expected to erode his capital sum, the plaintiff would need to be
awarded $20,000 as representing the value of his capital assets
designed to restore him to his pre-injury financial position. 40 If this
prevailed the following would result:

Year

Capital Value
at Start of
Year

19-3
19-4
19-5

$20,000
20,000
20,000

Interest
@ 5%

Consumption
at
Pre-Injury
Level

Capital
Value at
End of
Year

$1000
1000
1000

$(1000)
(1000)
(1000)

$20,000
20,000
20,000

In the above situation, the capital value would vary inversely with
the rate of interest prevailing at the time of the award and expected
to continue through the tenure of the plaintiff's disability. Thus, at a
10% rate of interest, the capital value required to produce $1000
annually would be $10,000; at 20% the requisite capital value
would be $5,000.
The inherent flaw in this technique of computation is indubitable.
The plaintiff would, under this method, enjoy not only compensation for his pecuniary loss, but would in addition derive a windfall
profit at the end of his disability period, amounting to his
enrichment. As Street has observed:
Of course it is plain beyond doubt that a permanently
incapacitated plaintiff is not entitled to that sum, interest from
leave
which would produce his lost earnings, for that would
41
intact the capital at his death for the benefit of his estate.
It is submitted that the above objection would apply with equal force
to temporary injuries, as shown in the foregoing illustration. Given
39. It may be argued that the successful plaintiff should receive some
compensation for the loss of use of his earnings for the past two years. The
inclusion of some interest element would be conceptually desirable and
computationally feasible.
40. The discussion here is concerned only with the portion of the total award
related to pecuniary loss, represented by earnings. It does not involve consideration
of the segment relating to pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, medical
expenses, etc..
41. Supra, note 2 at 112.
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the inherent disadvantage of this approach, it becomes imperative to
require the plaintiff to erode his capital sum in order to prevent his
enrichment at the expense of the defendant.
(b). Erosion of CapitalRequired
If one assumes the objective of damage awards as being for the
compensation of the plaintiff, it becomes necessary to compute that
component of the damage award relating to pecuniary loss in such a
manner that a specified sum of money, invested at some specified
rate of interest, will produce for the plaintiff, when taken with
capital erosion, annual income commensurate with his pre-injury
earnings, for some predetermined length of time (the period of
injury or working life expectancy), such that the plaintiff is left with
zero dollars of the originallump sum award at the end of the injury
period or life. 42 This objective may only be attained by discounting
to a present value the future cash flows lost by the plaintiff and
implicitly requiring capital erosion. Without the mechanism of
discounting, the plaintiff would remain subject to the criticism of
enrichment discussed above, although the extent of his enrichment
would be substantially reduced. Thus, in the context of the
illustration above, if the plaintiff were awarded $3000 ($1000 p.a. x
3 years) for the future loss of earnings, the following would result:
Consumption
Capital Value
at
at Start of
Interest Pre-Injury
@ 5%
Level
Year
Year
19-3
19-4
19-5

$3000
2150
1258

$150
108
63

$(1000)
(1000)
(1000)

Necessary
Erosion to
Supplement
Interest
Earned

Capital
Value at
End of
Year

$(850)
(892)
(937)

$2150
1258
321

In this situation the plaintiff is enriched to the extent of $321 at the
end of his injury period of three years, having received full
compensation of $3000 for his future loss of earnings. Thus, the
conceptual criticism of enrichment remains, albeit the magnitude of
the problem diminishes.
42. It is recognized that absolute mathematical accuracy is not attainable in the
computation of a damage award, in view of the number and complexity of the
variables involved, e.g. the rate of interest, estimated years of injury, estimate of
earnings, implied reinvestment at the original interest rate selected. However, any
move in the direction of the concept suggested, even if intuitively, rather than
mathematically applied, would enhance the desired objectives.
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(c). Suggested Method of Computation
In order to eliminate, at least conceptually, the enrichment of the
plaintiff, inherent in the above methods of computation, it becomes
essential to account for the time value of money. Two different
situations are encountered in this context:
(i) Temporary Injuries
Where the plaintiff has been temporarily injured and the period of
his injury has been adduced by expert medical testimony, the
underlying premise is that the plaintiff, having suffered an
economic loss estimated at his years of reduced or total incapacity,
should receive a discounted sum of money which, if invested at a
specified rate of interest, and assuming capital exhaustion at the end
of the injury period, will most nearly restore the plaintiff to his
pre-injury status in any pecuniary sense. This sum may be computed
from the following actuarial formula:
P

N (1 + r)- n 1
r(1 + r)

Where: P - the present value of the lump sum
N = annual payment to the plaintiff
n = total number of years of expected incapacity
r = percentage investment rate
Continuing with the previous illustration, the plaintiff should be
awarded a lump sum of $2724 in respect of his anticipated future
pecuniary loss. 4 3 Given the lump sum award the following would
result:

Year

Pre-Tax
Capital Value
at Start of
Year

Pre-Tax
Interest
Earned
@ 5%

Pre-Tax
Consumption
at Pre-Injury
Level

Pre-Tax
Capital Value
at End of Year

19-3

$2724

$136

$(1000)

$1860

19-4
19-5

1860
953

93
47

(1000)
(1000)

953
0

Using the above computational technique, the injured plaintiff is
restored to his pre-injury status during the tenure of his disability
43. $1000

3
(1.05) (1.05)
- 13
(0.05)

= $2724
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and is compensated as opposed to enriched for his anticipated
economic loss of future earnings.
A final consideration in the computation of quantum is the
selection of the appropriate discount rate. Should the discount rate
be applied on a pre-tax or net after-tax basis? In the preceding
analysis the discount rate of 5 per cent was assumed to be on a
pre-tax basis. Assuming further, that the plaintiff has a marginal tax
rate of 50 per cent in the year of receipt of his damage award of
$2724, and chooses not to make use of the forward averaging
provisions suggested later in this paper, he would be left with a
residue of $1362 on a net after-tax basis. Correspondingly reducing
the pre-injury consumption level to a net after-tax basis of $500 per
year, the following would result, if no further tax was levied on the
interest earned:

Year

After-Tax
Capital Value
at Startof
Year

Interest
Earned
@ 5%

After-Tax
Consumption
at Pre-Injury
Level

After-Tax
Capital Value
at End of Year

19-3
19-4
19-5

$1362
930
476

$68
46
24

$(500)
(500)
(500)

$930
476
0

Thus, once again the plaintiff would be restored to his after-tax
pre-injury level of earnings.
Where, however, the court applies an after tax discount rate of
2.5 pet cent to the after-tax cash flow of $500 per year (assuming a
marginal rate of 50 per cent), the plaintiff would receive $1428 as
his award. Implicit in this method, however, is the assumption that
the plaintiff would be taxed on his interest earned, and the following
would result:

Year

After-Tax
Capital Value
at Start of
Year

After-Tax
Interest at
2.5%

After-Tax
Consumption
at Pre-Injury
Level

After-Tax
Capital Value
at End of
Year

19-3
19-4
19-5

$1428
963
487

$35
24
13

$(500)
(500)
(500)

$963
487
0

It is worthy of emphasis that the plaintiff, under either alternative,
receives $500 per year on an after-tax basis. The difference of $66
($1428 - $1362) may be explained in the method selected for the tax
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treatment of the interest component subsequent to the award. The
pre-tax method assumes no further taxation of interest earned if the
plaintiff elects to pay his tax lump sum. The after-tax method
implicitly assumes subsequent taxation of the interest earned, by
selection of an after-tax interest rate. Hence the difference may be
explained as below:
Year

Pre-Tax Interest
@ 5%

After-Tax Interest
@ 2.5%

19-3
19-4
19-5

$68
46
24

$35
24
13

Difference
$33
22
11
$66

The appropriate technique of discounting, in the context of the
solution suggested in this paper, is discussed later.
(ii) Permanent Injuries
In a situation involving permanent injury to the plaintiff, the
impairment is such that the plaintiff will suffer economic loss for the
remainder of his working life. To determine the quantum of his
lump sum award in respect of his economic loss represented by the
reduction or elimination of his future earnings, an additional
preliminary step is required in the computation, prior to the
application of the discounting technique above described. This
preliminary step requires the determination of the plaintiff's life
expectancy or working life expectancy. Actuarial evidence should
be adduced to compute the injured party's working life span, to
derive a statistical evaluation of the injury period, which working
life span will be the period over which the plaintiff suffers economic
loss. It should be observed that the plaintiff suffers financial loss of
potential earnings only during the period of his working life span,
and that component of the total damage award should be computed
with reference to this period, which will usually be shorter than his
total life span. In contrast, the component of the damage award
relating to his pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life should
be computed over his total life span.
Recognition of the value of actuarial evidence in a court of law is
not by any means a novel notion. 44 As early as 1880, Lord
44. One detects in some judgments and legal writings the vestige of a flight from
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Blackburn observed on the utility of such evidence in
computational matters:
The Legislature has cast on the Court of Session the task of

"ascertaining the value" . . . but. . . has given no directions at
all as to how. . . I think the Legislature knew that the value of an

expectancy must, in a great degree at least, depend on the
probabilities of the duration of life, the chances of marriage, and
the chances of such marriage proving fruitful. They must, I think,
have known that actuaries had tables founded on extensive
experience, on which they acted, which enabled them to value
with considerable accuracy the probabilities of life; and that
though the experience on which calculations as to the
probabilities of marriage and issue were based was much
narrower, and the results more subject to uncertainty, yet that
some calculation could be made in that way, and none could be
made in any other. I think, therefore, that the Legislature must
have contemplated that the Court would call in the assistance of
an actuary, to report to them on all those matters which properly
come within the province of an actuary [emphasis added]. 4 5
(d). Characterization
The traditional analysis based on conceptual distinctions of the
capital asset theory and the substitution ("in lieu") theory can,
however, only be carried so far. When one gets to the point of
requiring, as an implicit assumption of the computation, the
plaintiff to erode his capital sum on a regular basis, which as seen
above is necessary so as to compensate and not enrich the plaintiff,
the distinction between capital asset and loss of earnings becomes
obscure. Ultimately the capital value of any property right is the
discounted present value of future cash flows emanating from that
property. What is land but the profits thereof? Thus, it is submitted,
that shorn of all its verbal decorations, the traditional analysis of
capital asset versus loss of earnings is not sufficient to provide a
satisfactory solution. For every asset may be viewed from two sides
of the same coin. It may be conceived of as the capitalized value of
future cash flows, and classified as a sum representing "capacity"
or a capital asset; but this capital asset represents no more than the
substitution of discounted future earnings. The two theories
figures. For an excellent expos6 on the misunderstanding prevalent in legal circles
regarding the nature and functions of actuarial tables, see A. T. Traversi, Actuaries
and the Courts (1955-56), 29 A.L.J. 557 at 577, where the author observes: "...
In certain ways, there appears to be a chasm between the thinking of courts and that
of actuaries in a sphere which is the peculiar province of the actuary ......
45. M'Donald v. M'Donald (1879-80), 5 A.C. 519 at 539-40
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condense down to different sides of the same equation, the
capitalized value being equal to the sum of the future earnings
discounted to their present value. Viewed in this light, inconsistent
tax treatment of different sides of the same equation is premised on
illusory and non-existent distinctions, and is reduced to an exercise
in semantics, with form prevailing over substance.
These propositions may be demonstrated by mathematical
formulations. Assuming an annuity contract paying a constant
stream of dollars in perpetuity, equivalent to the plaintiffs loss of
future earnings, and ignoring any element of risk, the capitalized
value is represented by:
V

$N

V = capitalized value on
discounted present value

Where:

$N = annual receipts representing
lost earnings
i = interest rate.
By summing a convergent geometric progression and writing out
the discounted terms one gets:
$N
+$N
(I+i2

[1+

(+i)

+

(

)+...

]

=$N

-$N + $N
1+i

Here it is suggested that, in the interest of logical consistency, the
fundamental characterization of "V" should retain the character of
the $N which are being discounted.
When the discussion is framed in the context of an injured
plaintiff in a personal injury action, the problem is magnified in one
sense, for one gets involved in the "value" of a human being or
some part of a human being, e.g. an arm, leg, eye, etc., the loss of
which "value" the court endeavours to recompense in some
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monetary sense. Without getting involved in Aristotelian ethics, the
court endeavours to recompense the injured party by two distinct
elements: (i) his financial earnings forsaken or destroyed which may
be classified as loss of earnings; and (ii) compensation for the loss
of amenities of life, which should be referred to as capacity
compensation, with "capacity" meaning the capacity to enjoy life
in his pre-injury condition.
If this basis for judicial compensation is accepted, then, it is
submitted that the first element -

the loss of earnings -

should be

subject to taxation, in that it conforms to our operationalized and
pragmatic concept of income as being an accretion to wealth and net
gain in a specified period of time, with such gains being
measurable, quantifiable, capable of objective determination and
administrative implementation. But the second element compensation for loss of amenities of life, which would include that
portion of the award granted for pain and suffering - should be
exempt from taxation in that such sums do not conform to our
notions of income as operationally applied. If one viewed income as
a flow of benefits as postulated by Fisher, one might be led to tax
man's personal attributes that provide benefits in some economic
sense, such as his good looks, character, facility for conversation,
etc.. However, the concept of income as operationally implemented
does not include such benefits. Since these personal amenities of
life are not taxed initially, one should not tax any element of the
damage award attributable to the replacement of these amenities,
e.g. the money paid to the injured party for the loss of the use of his
legs and the foregone pleasure of walking; the loss of his eyes and
the forsaken pleasure of sight. This second element does not provide
any accretion to wealth, in that it merely replaces the initial
non-taxable "stock" or "amenities" of the individual. In contrast,
the first element -

loss of earnings -

contributes towards the

individual's wealth in substitute of that which was initially taxable
and should be taxed in like manner. Issues relating to the
appropriate medium and manner of taxation of the loss of earnings
46
component are deferred to a later section of this paper.
Restating the above propositions in the context of income theory,
one may apply the first leg of the three-pronged test enunciated
earlier. Does a personal injury damage award result in an
improvement in the economic power of the individual, capable of
46. Infra, at 425 et seq.
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objective measurement and quantification? 47 The answer would
appear to be unequivocally in the affirmative for that portion of the
total damage award which relates to the compensation for loss of
actual and potential earnings. This would indicate a prima facie
classification of the earnings component as income, subject to the
reconciliation of such awards with the theory of damages on a
conceptual level, and the ultimate resolution of any pragmatic,
inhibiting, or restraining factors generated by the second and third
48
prongs of the income test.
III. Theory ofDamages
The tax treatment of damage awards or the influence of tax factors
in the determination of the quantum of such awards, must, as
intimated earlier, be reconciled with some conceptual theory of
damages, prior to any final resolution of the problem posited in this
paper. Conceptual neglect in this area rivals that found in the realm
of income theory, despite the importance of the question. As Street
has suggested:
It is believed that the crucial questions are just as frequently
ones of damages, but little doctrinal discussion of that topic is
carried on. Of course, liability is easier to discuss, for it lends
itself to that process of conceptualization which judges find so
hard to resist. 49
With a view to facilitating the doctrinal discassion of the issues
involved, the concept of damages and the judicial determination of
quantum, is analyzed on a comparative basis.
The underlying principle of the theory of damages in tort actions
has long been held to be, either explicitly or implicitly,
compensation in the form of monetary restitutio in integrum.
Punitive or exemplary damages are the exception to the oft cited
rule of compensation. Hence, Street enunciates the above
proposition by observing that
• . . with the exception of exemplary damages, then, the function
of all heads of damage is to compensate the plaintiff on the
principle of restitutio in integrum . . . where the loss suffered is
pecuniary but not capable of exact calculation the courts still
accept the principle of restitutio in integrum . . .50
47.
48.
49.
50.

Supra at 396.
Infra, at 425 et seq.
Supra, note 2 at 43.
Supra, note 2 at 3.
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A similar view was expressed by the House of Lords a century
earlier, when Lord Blackburn observed:
I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to its being a
general rule that, where an injury is to be compensated by
damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation
of damages you should as nearly as possible get at the sum of
money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has
suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had
not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his
compensation or reparation. 5 1
Fifty years later an identical sentiment was echoed by Viscount
Dunedin, that
S.. the common law says that the damages due either for breach
of contract or for tort are damages which, so far as money can
compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the
wrongful act. .... 52
The American and Canadian views in regard to the theoretical
premise of damage awards are similar. In theory at least, and apart
from rare punitive damage situations, the damages awarded in
personal injury actions are compensatory in character, with an
objective of making good the victim's losses. The purpose, then, is
to restore the injured person to the position he would have occupied
had the wrongdoing not occurred, to the extent that a monetary
award can accomplish this objective. 53 In Canada the judicial
approach is towards "fair" rather than perfect compensation, with
the jury being required to take a reasonable view of the case and
give what they consider to be fair compensation. 54 Thus in Boarelli
v. Flannigan,the Court observed:
... It has also been said on many occasions that damages
awarded in negligence cases for personal injury are not to be
'punitive', still less are they to be reward; they are to be
compensatory only and these propositions are said to be
applicable to both special damages as well as general damages
55

This similarity of the theoretical foundations

in all three

51. Livingston v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1879-80), 5 A.C. 25 at 39.
52. Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Susquehanna, [1926] A.C. 655 at 661.
53. D. B. Dobbs, Remedies, s. 81; C. T. McCormick, Damages, s. 137; Higgins
v. Guerin (1952), 245 P. 2D 956 (Ariz. S.C.); 22 Am. Jur. (2d), Damages, s. 12,
13,85.
54. Sheahen v. Toronto Rv., [1911] 25 O.L.R. 310 (C.A.); Anderson v.
Forrester(1914), 7 W.W.R. 1039 (Man. K.B.).
55. (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4 at 7 (Ont. C.A.).
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jurisdictions extends to the structural heads under which damage
awards are identified, with the initial distinction being drawn
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss.
The pecuniary component of the damage award represents
financial losses incurred as a consequence of the tortious injury of
the plaintiff and may conveniently be subdivided into two principal
sub-categories (a) Past Loss of Earnings and (b) Future Loss of
Earnings. Each of these subdivisions of the pecuniary component is
examined with a view to characterization of the damage award and
its subsequent treatment in the context of income and tax theories.
1. PastLoss ofEarnings
This sub-category of the pecuniary component of the total damage
award represents the easiest computational segment, with minimal
associations of uncertainty and conceptual confusion. In AngloCanadian jurisdictions the amount claimed by the plaintiff is listed
under the head of special damages and represents the actual loss
already suffered by the victim until the date of the trial. Where the
plaintiff is paid wages or a salary, the loss of earnings up to the date
56
of the trial can usually be determined by a simple calculation.
How then should these special damages, representing the actual
past loss of earnings be characterized? Do they represent the
replacement of a capital asset, or are they "-in lieu" of actual
earnings lost? It is submitted that this element subscribes to the
substitution theory and that the plaintiff receives what he would
otherwise have received in direct remuneration. This "in lieu" or
substitution of earnings theory receives judicial approval when one
examines those situations where some extraneous factor occurring
in the past may have affected the plaintiff's wages or earnings for a
particular period of time. Thus, a plaintiff may have been employed
in a factory which happened to be closed for a period of time for one
reason or another, e.g. strike, lay-off, etc. In such cases, the
plaintiff's compensation has been correspondingly reduced, not, it
is submitted, for any change in his impaired condition or capacity,
but rather due to the substitution effect of his lost earnings. The
English Court of Appeal exhaustively reviewed the computational

56. D.A. Kemp and M.S. Kemp, The Quantum of Damages (3d ed. London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1967); A. Samuels, Damages in Personal Injury Cases
(1968), 17 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 443.

Taxation of Personal Injury Awards 411

mechanism applicable in these circumstances in Phillips v. London
& S. W. Rly., where Brett L.J. outlined the technique:
Bramwell L.J. has described how the earnings of a working
man ought to be dealt with. I agree with his view subject to this
remark, that his description assumes that no circumstances
existed which would have prevented the working man from
earning the same wages during the time he was in fact disabled. If
the plaintiff had resided in Lancashire and had earned his
livelihood by working at the mills there, and if all the mills in
Lancashire had been closed from the date of the accident, the jury
whether he could have
would have to weigh that fact and consider
57
continued to earn his ordinary wages.
Further, this substitutional mechanism of determination has not
been altered with the passage of time, as was demonstrated by the
decision in Rouse v. Port of London Authority. 58 There the plaintiff
had been employed as an "A-Bookman" docker at the the time of
his injury. As a result of his injury he was downgraded to a
"C-Bookman", at a lower wage scale. Had the Court applied a
"strict capacity" view of the plaintiff's loss, he would have
received the difference between his post- and pre-injury earnings on
the premise that his "capacity" had been impaired. Not so,
however. Rather, the Court examined employment conditions on
the docks during the tenure of the injury to determine the
substitutionalloss of earnings suffered. As Parker J. remarked:
So far as the special damage is concerned, there are, as I have
said, the thirteen weeks when he did not work at all, which is
£127 19s lid. From then until June 13, after which no claim is
made, he had light work on and off; and if you make a
mathematical calculation, the difference between what his
he in fact made in
pre-accident rate of earnings was and what
59
light work, you get a loss of £358 Ils. 6d.
This portion of £358 would in any view of the capacity theory
represent the loss attributable to the plaintiff's impaired capacity to
work as an "A-Bookman." However, the Court was not prepared
to rest its computation on that premise. Rather, it went on to reduce
the award on the premise of what the plaintiff would actually have
earned had he actually worked. Parker J. continued:
As against that, it is agreed that even if he had been classed, as
he was originally, as an "A-Bookman", he might well not have
57. (1879), L.R. 5 C.P.D. 280 at 291 (C.A.).
58. [1953]2 Lloyds Rep. 179 (Q.B).
59. Id. at 184.
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been in full employment, because conditions changed during that
59
period in the docks, and I must make some allowance for that. a
This substitutional premise of compensation is even more
dramatically highlighted when one examines those situations where
the plaintiff has already been compensated by his employer on a
purely voluntary basis. Hence, in Dell v. Vermette 60 , the Ontario
High Court held that the tortfeasor was not liable for the plaintiff's
loss of wages, since he had already been compensated for his wages
by the employer on a voluntary basis. At first blush, one might be
inclined to constrain the ratio to the premise that the defendant was
not liable because the plaintiff suffered no loss. However, this view
could only be supported if the wages which the plaintiff received
were viewed on the basis of the substitution theory. For the fact of
the plaintiff's "impaired capacity" remained a constant, whether or
not his employer compensated him. Further, if the substitutionary
("in lieu") theory is rejected, and the plaintiff is held to receive his
wages in return for his "impaired capacity", then such wages
would logically be exempt from taxation by virtue of the Jennings6 1
decision and the unexpressed DNR policy of non-taxation of such
awards! He would then be placed in a better position financially,
merely because the employer continued to pay his wages during the
injury period.
While the issue of whether or not a court should consider the
value of any collateral benefits received by the plaintiff has not been
cbnclusively resolved, an examination of the cases including and
excluding such benefits in the determination of quantum indicates
the courts' implicit, if not explicit, adoption of the "in lieu" theory
in the actual computational process. In Moore v. Taylor 62 , the
plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury as a result of the defendant's
negligence. A wage loss of $5137 was proved, and it was further
established that the plaintiff received $2185 out of an employment
mutual benefit fund, the premiums of which had been contributed
50% by the plaintiff and 50% by the employer. The British
Columbia Supreme Court held that there should be deducted from
the plaintiff's wage loss that portion of the $2185 that had been paid
by the employer, i.e. $1242. Wootton J. remarked: "...
I
59a. Id.
60. (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 101 (Ont. H.C.).
61. [1966] S.C.R. 532; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644.
62. [197313 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.S.C.).
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conclude that the $2185 is part of wage loss. Therefore, of that
amount the amounts of money paid by the company are paid on
account of wages .

. . ."

As a consequence of this view, the

plaintiff received $2142 from the mutual benefit fund being the
employer's contribution, and $3895 from the defendant, giving him
a total of $5137 being the exact amount of his established wage loss
as special damages.
In contrast, in Balla v. Corporate-PlanLeasing Ltd. 63, collateral
benefits were excluded in determining special damages. The ratio,
however, supports the "in lieu" theory of damage computation.
The injured plaintiff suffered a wage loss of $9132 and received
$1300 under a weekly sickness and accident benefit plan. In
excluding the $1300 from the computation, the Court reasoned that
it was not a wage loss. As Morand J. explained: 64 ". . . I am
prepared to accept that this weekly sickness and accident benefit is
I am fixing the lost wages to the
not in lieu of wage payments ....
following . . . $9132 . . . ", thereby explicitly accepting that the

$9132 was in lieu of lost wages.
2. FutureLoss ofEarnings
In turning from past earnings loss to the loss of future earnings, the
underlying foundation remains the same. The person suffering the
damage is entitled to full compensation for the financial loss
suffered. The problem, however, remains: Is the plaintiff receiving
his compensation for financial loss in lieu of lost earnings or his
impaired earning capacity? Sir J. Holder, Attorney-General, stated
in argument in the Phillips case:
It is no doubt the rule that a jury must not attempt to give a man
full compensation for bodily injury; if they were to do so there
would be no limit to the amount of damages, for no sum would be
eyes; but full compensation is
equivalent for the loss of a man's
65
to be made for pecuniary loss.
James L.J. delivered the opinion of the Court with Brett and Cotton
L.JJ. concurring:
...

[Y]ou are to consider what his income would probably

have been, how long that income would probably have lasted,
and you are to take into consideration all the other contingencies
63. (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 360 (Ont. H.C.).
64. Id. at 362 - 63.

65. (1879), 5 Q.B.D. 78 at84.
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to which a practice is liable . . . the consequences of the
wrongful act here are undoubtedly that Dr. Phillips has been and
is prevented from earning such a sum of money as you think he
would have been likely to earn if this accident had not
happened. 66
While the above-mentioned may indicate the variables which a
jury should consider, such as the earnings of the injured plaintiff,
the probability of continuity of these earnings, adjusted for
increases and decreases resulting from the contingencies of life, it
does not provide conclusive indicia permitting of classification of
damage awards into a capacity or loss of earnings dichotomy. In
addition, the writings of some academics do little more than state
the conclusion on some a posteriori determination, assuming the
conclusion to be derived. Thus, Fleming suggests that such awards
compensate impaired capacity and as such should be exempt from
tax, by observing that ". . .o]n a technical level, it may be
supported on the ground that the basis of compensation is loss of
earning capacity, a capital asset, rather than loss of earnings, a form
of income .... ,,67 On the other hand, the Kemps conclude a
posteriori that ". . . the plaintiff is awarded compensation for
prospective loss of earnings and not for loss of earning capacity,
treated as a capital asset ....",68
As indicated earlier in the context of the discussion on income
theory, the traditional analysis of the problem in the context of
capacity (capital asset) theory versus a loss of earnings ("in lieu")
theory is severely constrained by its own parameters, as observed in
the remarks of Diplock L.J., in Browning's case, that ". . .[a]
plaintiff is not entitled to damage for loss of capacity to earn money
unless it is established that he would, but for his injuries, have
exercised that capacity in order to earn money .... "69 The
resulting circularity of this approach derives from the measure of
capacity itself; for the measure of capacity on one side of the
equation is equal to the exercise of that capacity to earn money and
represented by the prospective and past loss of earnings on the other
side of the same equation. The traditional analysis carried to its
ultimate has resulted in the differential treatment of damage awards
66. Id. at 87.
67. J. Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent? (1969), 19 U. Toronto L.J. 295 at

316.
68. Supra, note 56 at 24.
69. Browning v. War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750 at 766 (C.A.).
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for purposes of taxation, depending on which side of the same
equation one views the award. Any conclusions derived from such
an analysis would at worst be accidental and capricious, and at best
fortuitous.
In order to break the tautological process inherent in the
traditional analysis, it becomes imperative to dissect the mechanism
of judicial determination of damage awards. Thus, while Samuels
has suggested that the ". . . courts have never decided whether the
basis of compensation is loss of probable actual earnings or loss of
earning capacity . . . ." ,7 it is submitted that an examination of
the methodology of judicial computation reveals the nature of
judicial reasoning, and suggests a dichotomy for classification of
such awards.
This judicial methodology involves an initial breakdown of the
award into two component elements: the pecuniary element is
determined as a function of the plaintiff's loss of past and future
earnings and medical expenses adjusted for the various contingencies of life; the non-pecuniary element is premised on the
assumption that a plaintiff should receive compensation for his loss
of the amenities of life. This initial dichotomy may be seen in the
Gourley71 decision itself. The respondent, a senior partner in a firm
of civil engineers, was seriously injured in a railway accident for
which the appellants admitted liability. In assessing the quantum of
damages, the trial judge provided the following breakdown:
(i) Actual loss of earnings
(ii) Estimated future loss of earnings

£ 15220
22500
£37720

(iii)
(iv)

Out-of-pocket expenses
Pain and suffering

1000
9000

The sole issue before the House of Lords was whether the incidence
of income tax and surtax should be taken into account in assessing
that part of the damages attributable to actual or prospective loss of
earnings. Their Lordships were of the view that income tax factors
should be accounted for, and they reduced the quantum of the award
from £37,720 down to £ 6,695. The severity of the decision and
suggestions for amelioration are discussed later in this paper. 72 For
70. Samuels, supra, note 56 at 444.
71. [1956] A.C. 185; [1956]2W.L.R. 41; [1955]3 All E.R. 796 (H.L.).
72. infra at 425.
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present purposes, the rationale underlying their Lordships' decision
is pertinent. Their Lordships were moved by a concern to pursue the
determination of the quantum in the context of the theory of
damages. In this context Earl Jowitt observed:
.. .[T]he tribunal should award the injured party such a sum
of money as will put him in the same position
as he would have
73
been if he had not sustained the injuries.
Lord Goddard, in addressing the issue, commented:
Damages which have to be paid for personal injuries are not
punitive, still less are they a reward. They are simply
compensation, and this is as true
with regard to special damages
74
as it is with general damages.
The sum represented by £37,720 was designed to substitute that
which the respondent had lost by way of past and prospective
earnings, which amounts should have been subject to tax in the
normal course of events. The non-pecuniary element of £9000
replaced the respondent's amenities of life and was treated by their
Lordships in a manner similar to the treatment it should have
75
ordinarily received, i.e. tax exempt status.
An analysis of those few cases in all three jurisdictions which
present a computational breakdown of damages awarded under the
head of general damages reveals a judicial mechanism designed to
compensate on a two-pronged basis. In the first component the court
endeavours to substitute the plaintiffs loss of earnings. In the
second component the tribunal seeks to replace impaired capacity,
in the sense of the plaintiff's loss of amenities of life. Hence, in
Senior v. Barker & Allen Limited, where a young boy had his right
hand crushed in an industrial accident, the Court awarded £ 6500 in
general damages. The computational mechanism is demonstrated by
Lord Denning M.R.:
73. [1956] A.C. 185 at 197; [19561 2 W.L.R. 41 at 43; [1955] 3 All E.R. 796 at
799.
74. Id. at 208; [1956]2 W.L.R. at52; [1955]3 All E.R. at 805.
75. The emphasis on "should" deserves explanation. In the course of litigation,
the parties in Gourley had stipulated that the damage award would be tax-exempt,
under the British Income Tax Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c. 10, and
would not have fallen within Schedule D. Hence, the ratio of Gourley is that the
principle of reduction of the damage award by tax factors applies when two
conditions are satisfied: (1)in calculating damages, reference is made to income
which would be taxable, and (2) the sum awarded by way of damages is by law or
(absent any legal ruling) by concession of the litigants based on Inland Revenue
Practice, not taxable because it is deemed to represent a capital sum. This gives rise
to "Gourley's Paradox" that the court should account for tax factors when Inland
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The usual practice in these courts is to take, especially with a
boy of this age, a substantial number of years purchase; fifteen
years' purchase at that figure would give a very substantial sum
for loss offuture earnings. It might be as much as £4000. Then,
in addition, there is the loss of amenities; he has been deprived of
the use of the hand, and has none of the amenities of life which a
good hand gives. It was accepted by counsel that in these days
that figure might well be in region of£ 2500[emphasis added]. 76
Canadian computational techniques are similar. The court endeavours to compensate the plaintiff on the same two bases as in
Goshen v. Larin, 7 an action for battery on the plaintiff's person.
As a consequence of the battery the plaintiff was off work and lost
wages of $96 per week for twelve weeks and was awarded $1152 as
special damages. In addition he obtained $700 in general damages,
the Court observing that ". . . the plaintiff also suffered some pain
and inconvenience for a period of two or three months and he also
lost the use of his wrist and arm for that period of time ... "
[emphasis added]
However, when the issue was presented to the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Jennings78 case, the Court circumvented the central
issue of whether the award or any portion of it related to loss of
earnings or impaired capacity, by assuming the conclusion. It
should be observed that at trial the trial judge had dissected with rare
clarity the basis of computation of the total damage award as
follows:
(1) Out of pocket expenses
$ 13,801
(2) Loss of salary to date of trial
33,800
(3) Additional expenses
600
(4) Expenses of appointing committee
529
(5) Hospital expenses for expected life
20,075
(6) Estimated medical expenses for expected life
2,600
(7) Estimated loss in connection with stock options
18,590
(8) The present value of loss of salary for expected
remaining life after deduction of tax
104,000
(9) Loss of enjoyment of life
2,000
Revenue regards the payment as in respect of a capital loss, and ignore tax factors
when the Inland Revenue regards the payments as income. While one appreciates
their Lordships' desire to achieve compensation and avoid multiple taxation of the
same proceeds, the suggested proposals of this writer at 425 et seq., would
eliminate the need for conceptual acrobatics.
76. [196511 W.L.R. 429 at 432 (C.A.).
77. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 137 (N.S.S.C., T.D.).
78. [1966] S.C.R. 532; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644.
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The contentious issue for purposes of this discussion related to items
(2) and (8). The Court concluded that income tax factors should not
enter into the computation of damage awards and increased item (8)
back to its pre-tax level. In reaching its decision the Court cited
several pragmatic considerations for ignoring tax factors in
determination of quantum 79 . However, it skirted the primary
conceptual issue by assuming without discussion that the loss
represented compensation for impairment of capacity. As Judson J.
succinctly observed: ".

.

. For what it is worth, my opinion is that

an award of damages for impairment of earning capacity would not
be taxable under the Canadian Income Tax Act. . ...,80 Thus, with

remarkable brevity and without analysis of the thorny issue, the
Supreme Court of Canada chose to ignore the conceptual dilemma
inherent in such situations, and, as the ultimate arbiter of appeals in
income tax matters, rendered a dictum on the possible tax treatment
of such awards.
In the United States, where one might expect greater clarity in the
characterization of damage award payments, due to the presence of
s. 104 of the Code, the conceptual analysis is no less confused.
While the presence of s. 104 of the Code has statutorily resolved
one aspect of the dilemma and given definitive authority that such
awards are not to be taxed by the IRS, it has not resolved the issue
of whether income tax factors should be considered by the court in
the determination of the quantum of the award. The general view
has been that tax factors should not be taken into account by the
court8 1 ; there are, however, enough decisions on the other side of
the fence to make the issue sufficiently contentious. Hence, in
Floyd v. FruitIndustries, where the Supreme Court of Connecticut
had to consider the quantum of damages in a wrongful death suit,
the Court, in assessing the award, observed:
Damages for wrongful death, as such, are allowed as
compensation for the destruction of the decedent's capacity to
carry on life's activities, including his capacity to earn money, as
he would have if he had not been killed .. .It follows that in

many respects damages are assessed in the same way as in a
nonfatal case involving a total and permanent destruction of
capacity to carry on life's activities ...the injury in the first
79. The pragmatic hurdles considered by the Supreme Court are evaluated, with
suggested solutions at 425 et seq.
80. [1966] S.C.R. 532 at 544; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644 at 655 [emphasis added].
81. 22 Am. Jur (2d), Damages, s.88, 1965; Annot. (1959), 63 A.L.R. (2d) 1393.
1398-1404, 1420-22.
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instance is as to probable net earnings, in the ordinary sense of
that phrase as used in accounting practice, during the probable
lifetime . . . there is an important factor which must be offset

against probable net earnings. Thatfactor is any saving in income
tax liability which can properly82be attributed to cessation of
earned income [emphasis added].
The Court went on to uphold the award on the basis of net earnings
8 3
after tax as being the just, realistic, and fair rule of compensation.
Again in Montellier v. UnitedStates 84 , the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, were content with either proposition - of
consideration or non-consideration of tax factors in determining
awards. The case involved a wrongful death action, and the Court
refused to reverse on the issue of non-deduction of income taxes,
observing that ". . . [i]t would not have been erroneous... for the
trial judge to have made a deduction for income taxes, which would
have amounted to a substantial sum in this case. . .

."

In other

situations, appeal courts have considered the issue of tax factors as
an adjunct to the determination of whether an award was excessive.
Hence, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie8 5 , the Ninth Circuit, in
evaluating whether an award of $100,000 was too high, commented
that
... due regard for the principle of compensation required
recognition that a plaintiff should not be in a better position
financially than he would have been if he had continued to work,
and that hence some consideration of tax deductions is proper
• . . [W]e think the Court's view that the net take-home pay, after
taxes, would represent the actual loss, is correct ....
Finally, in at least one American jurisdiction, the Court adopted a
hybrid pose by accounting for tax factors on the past earnings
component, and ignoring such considerations in assessing the loss
86
offuture earnings.
82. (1957), 136 A. 2d 918 at 924-25 (Conn. S.C. Errors).
83. See also Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co. (1961), 200 F. Supp. 183 (Conn;
U.S.D.C.); DeVito v. United AirLines (1951), 98 F. Supp. 88 (N.Y.; U.S.D.C.);
Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co. (1955), 282 P.2d 23 (Cal. S.C.); Annot.
(1959), 63 A.L.R. 2d 1393 at 1423 - 24.
84. (1963), 315 F. 2d 180 at 186 (U.S.C.A., 2d Cir.).
85. (1951), 186 F. 2d 926 (U.S.C.A., 9th Cir.), cert. denied (1951), 341 U.S.
904.
86. Beaulieu v. Elliott (1967), 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska S.C.). It is interesting to
observe that the Court viewed the rationale of the "majority rule" of ignoring tax
considerations as being uncertainty in determination and not any capacity theory:
...For the rule -

inability to predict with sufficient certainty what taxes
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Underlying the judicial approach of the courts in the United
States as indicated by the above cases, has been the search, as in
Canada and in England, for a conceptual reconciliation of the
function of damage awards to achieve compensation with the
concept of net income. The task, however, has met with the same
lack of success as in Canada, due in part at least to similar verbal
distortions and the absence of concentration on the conceptual
foundations, as illustrated by Grant v. Thomas 87 . In that case the
plaintiff, a janitor, was injured in an auto accident and suffered
whiplash as a consequence. As a result of the accident the plaintiff
missed work for fourteen days with a loss of wages amounting to
$160. The plaintiff recovered $11,000 comprised as follows:
Special Damages
$

Medical

135

85
160

Property
Past Loss of Wages
General Damages
Pain & Suffering
Impaired Capacity

$ 4,020
6,600
$11,000

Despite the victim's full compensation for his full loss of earnings
and for associated pain and suffering, he received an incremental
$6,600 for impaired capacity. The Supreme Court of Iowa observed
that loss of earning capacity is to be measured by ".

.

. the present

value of the loss of impairment of general earning capacity, rather
than loss of wages or earnings in a specific occupation .... 88 At

first glance this would appear to be in direct contrast to the English
view as expressed in the Browning8 9 decision. However, further
analysis of the decision reveals that while the Court was avowedly
compensating "impairment of capacity", the Court's perception of
"capacity" was not an economic one in the sense of the capital
asset or replacement of capital theory, but rather blended in with the
would have to be paid - does not exist here, because taxes on income earned
prior to trial can be easily calculated based on income tax laws and regulations
as they existed at the time the wages would have been earned .... (673).
87. (1962), 118 N.W. 2d 545 (Iowa S.C.).
88. Id. at 548.
89. [1963] 1 Q.B. 750.
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notion of pain and suffering and amenities of life. As the Court
reasoned:
He does not do the janitor work at the school as well as he did
before the accident. He does not play games with the children as
he did before. The children on the bus give him more trouble
because he is nervous. He has given up Little League baseball
and no longer works around the house and yard. Because of the
pain in his neck he sometimes either walks the floor or sleeps in a
chair. 90
The Court then, in evaluating the claim of the plaintiff, and in
awarding the $6,600 for impairment of capacity, is really talking of
those attributes relating to the quality of life, which, traditionally,
when taken from a plaintiff by a negligent defendant, are
compensated through the medium of the pain and suffering or loss
of amenities of life element of the award; this could equally have
been achieved by awarding $10,620 for loss of amenities of life.
If, however, one examines the underlying judicial mechanism in
operation in the determination of awards - quite apart from the
interchangeable labels attached to the various elements - one
observes in the American decisions a similarity of approach in the
techniques of computation to the Canadian and English methodology. Hence, in Kinchen v. Cottle, 9 1 where the plaintiff was injured
in an auto accident, necessitating absence from work for a period of
eight weeks, he was compensated as follows:
Medical Expenses
Pain & Suffering
Past Loss of Earnings

$ 50
1,250
148
$1,448

The past loss of earnings was increased from $100 to $148 by the
appellate court on the premise that the greater sum represented
"... the difference between his Workmen's Compensation rate of
$32.50 and wages of $50 per week for the eight and one-half weeks
." thereby supporting the substitutional or "in lieu" theory of
compensation over and above the amount attributable to pain and
suffering. So also in Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Craig92 , where the
90. (1962), 118 N.W. 2d 545 at 547.
91. (1965), 173 So. 2d 379 (Louis. C.A.; 2d Cir.)
92. (1968), 430 S.W. 2d 573 at 575 (Texas Civil C.A.).
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Court of Appeals held that ".

.

.[i]f a plaintiff's earning capacity is

not totally destroyed, but only impaired, extent of his loss can best
be shown under evidence by comparing actual earnings before and
after the injury. .... "

The preceding analysis reveals the reckless abandon with which
judicial decisions and academic literature have employed phrases
such as "capacity", "earnings ability", "loss of earnings",
"replacement of capital", etc., as if nothing would depend on their
choice. As a consequence of the resulting confusion, like a
self-fulfilling prophecy little has depended on the choice of
terminology, and conceptualism has been cast to the winds in this
area of the law. Thus in MacDonald v. Deson93 , a decision
subsequent to Jennings, the action involved a claim for damages by
the widow of the deceased, by way of compensation for negligence
causing death. The trial court assessed damages and in so doing
took account of potential tax factors applicable to the deceased. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the award and
distinguished the Jennings decision with the terse comment that
...this is not a case that comes within the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court of Canada . . . where the Court was

considering the impaired earning capacity of the party injured
Rather the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that
...in arriving at the net income of the deceased to which the
family might be entitled in a case of this kind, the income tax
payable by the deceased would have to be deducted. Had the
deceased lived, the widow could not under any circumstances
have been entitled to the benefits of his gross earnings94without,
amongst other things, the deductions of his income tax.
Would Jennings, had he not been injured, have had the benefits of
his gross earnings without any deductions for income tax?
The above case juxtaposed against the Jennings decision
demonstrates the convenient elasticity of terminology such as
"earning capacity" and "loss of earnings" as found in judicial
usage. In Jennings the plaintiff was awarded $33,800 past earnings
to the date of the trial, plus $104,000 anticipated loss of earnings
(later increased to a pre-tax basis), over and above amounts awarded
for pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, etc.. The Court
93. (1970), 73 W.W.R. 241 (B.C.C.A).
94. Id. at 248.
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characterized these sums as being amounts in lieu of earning
capacity. In MacDonald the "capacity" of the wage earner was
totally extinguished and the compensation was premised on the
deceased's loss of potential earnings based on actuarial evidence
indicating that he would have continued employment till age
seventy. This was characterized on the "in lieu" theory as being
substitution of earnings and tax factors were considered to base the
award on a net earnings basis.
Other Canadian cases have similarly departed from the Jennings
ratio with comparable facility. In May v. Metro Toronto, the
Ontario High Court, in assessing the damages in a wrongful death
action, felt
. . .it is quite clear, however, that the Jennings case does not
apply to the case at bar in any event, for the present case is not
taken by the person who would be earning the income but by the
person who would be receiving a benefit from the net income. It
is obvious that the widow at no time was entitled to the income
and at no time was she ever able to receive or could she count on
receiving either as a right or as a gratuitous payment anything
more than the net income of the deceased after deducting income
tax ....
95
The Court thus distinguished the Jennings decision on either (1) the
basis of standing of the plaintiff and postulated a different rule
where the plaintiff is the estate of the deceased, as opposed to the
injured plaintiff, or (2) that the widow was not entitled to anything
more than net income. The first distinction lacks any conceptual
substance and is premised on mere form. The second distinction
ignores the premise that the deceased himself would not have been
any more entitled to gross income than his widow, and is a
distinction without a difference. The issue was finally presented to
the Supreme Court of Canada in Gehrmann v. Lavoie,95a to
determine whether the Jennings principle was confined to non-fatal
personal injury cases. A majority of the Court decided that the
Jennings principle applied to fatal accident situations, thereby
overruling the lower court decisions which had adopted a contrary
view.
Insofar as the primary purpose of damage awards is compensation, both of the elements of the total damage award - pecuniary
loss and loss of amenities of life - represent substitutional sums of
95. (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 659 at 662 (Ont. H.C.).
95a. (1976), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 634 (S.C.C.).
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money. This substitutional aspect alludes to the computational
methodology in the determination of quantum, and should be
extended to the subsequent conceptual characterization. The
distinction, however, between the two elements, despite their
similarity in being substitutionary, should lie in the initial
dichotomy of the elements which the award seeks to replace.
Whereas the pecuniary element seeks to replace that which in its
original format was taxable, the element pertaining to the monetary
replacement of the amenities of life substitutes for that which was
initially exempt from all tax. This approach would be similar in
philosophy to that suggested in Raytheon9 6 that ". . .[als in other
types of tort damage suits, recoveries which represent a
reimbursement for lost profits would be taxable income, the
proceeds of litigation which are their substitute are taxable in like
manner. .... " The question then to be asked is: In lieu of what
were the damages awarded? The response suggested in this paper is
that one element is awarded to replace and substitute for potential
lost earnings, and should be characterized accordingly. The second
component relating to the compensation for loss of amenities of life
should similarly be substitutionally characterized and totally exempt
from all tax implications and considerations.
Given the desired and oft stated objective of compensation in the
determination of damage awards, the above recommended
substitutional characterization of the two principal components, and
their subsequent tax treatment in a manner similar to the treatment
afforded the original elements, has the enviable attribute of
enhancing conceptual purity both in the area of damage and income
theory, while at the same time injecting a dose of equity into the
bloodline of the tax structure. If the above substitutional
characterization is accepted, the problem of implementation comes
to the fore. As intimated earlier, two major alternatives present
themselves for consideration. On the one hand is the Gourley
solution of the judicial consideration of tax factors in determination
of quantum, an alternative which has met with severe criticism as a
result of the inherent limitations, rigour and rigidity of this
approach. On the other hand is the alternative, recommended by this
writer, that all tax consequences and the tax treatment of the damage
award should be vested in the hands of the appropriate
administrative agency, the Department of National Revenue in
96. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm. (1944),
denied (1944), 323 U.S. 779.

144 F. 2d. 110 (1st Cir.), cert.
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Canada, with suitable statutory safeguards incorporated into the
taxing statute.
IV. Suggested Methodologyfor Taxation in Canada
In the context of the conceptual framework of the preceding
analysis, and the recommendation that that element of the total
damage award which corresponds to the substitution of past and
future earnings, should be subject to taxation, it becomes imperative
to devise a method which achieves at the same time the conceptual
and equitable integration of the theories of income and damages
with the pragmatic objectives of administrative convenience and
simplicity. There has been a plethora of criticism of the proposition
propounded in the Gourley decision that the court should take into
account income tax factors in assessing the quantum of an award in
personal injury actions. The criticism, premised on both the
doctrinal and pragmatic implications of a judicial tribunal
endeavouring to account for such tax factors, is in the opinion of
this writer well directed. On a doctrinal level, the criticisms run the
range from issues of remoteness and res inter alios acta to the
inequity of applying progressive tax rates to bunched income
receipts. 97 On a pragmatic plane, issues of flexibility of planning,
uncertainty of future tax rates, foreign income problems, simplicity,
the possibility of double taxation, and the added delay and expense
of trials are raised by critics .98
If, however, one views the legal system as the totality of various
sub-systems, it becomes imperative that there be an integration of
the sub-systems directed towards some identified objective. Hence,
the limitations of one arm of the legal system in implementing an
objective should not form the rationale for rejection of the concept,
but rather should suggest the possibilities of implementation
through some other sub-system. The thrust of the criticisms levelled
against the consideration of tax factors by judicial tribunals is
thwarted in part by shifting the arena from the courts to the
Department of National Revenue. In devising the proposed
methodology for taxation in Canada herein outlined, the underlying
objective is the desire to reconcile the conceptual necessity for the
imposition of tax on that portion of the award relating to the
the most, serious objection,
97. As Fleming, supra, note 67 at 316, puts it ...
however, to taxing the award is that it would be intolerably punitive and inequitable
under our customary, highly graduated system of taxation ......
98. For a sampling see Street, supra, note 2; Dworkin, supra, note 10; Fleming,
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substitution of past and future earnings, with the desirable requisite
of an administratively feasible and equitable mechanism.
It is, however, the desire for equity within the taxing mechanism
which raises problems in construction of the structure. For one
dimension of equity is premised on the notion of the ability to pay,
which implies the existence of progressive tax rates. As the Carter
Commission observed:
. . . [W]e believe that taxes are fair when they are allocated
according to ability to pay, and that this would be achieved by the
application of a progressive rate structure to the annual tax
base ..

.9

However, the very existence of the progressive tax rate structure,
designed as an instrument to promote equity, may become the
sword of inequity when indiscriminately applied. It should be
remembered that the choice of a calendar year as a time interval for
the basis of computation of tax liabilities for an individual is an
artificial creation, divorced from any conceptual understanding of
income, designed to enhance simplicity and administrative
feasibility at the expense of a sacrifice in equity. Hence, the Carter
Commission commented that
.. . there is nothing sacrosanct about the measurement of income
for tax purposes on an annual basis. The choice of the calendar
year as the relevant time period is a matter of convention and
convenience rather than principle. .... 100

Once again we are posed with the dilemma - How much of a
sacrifice is required in the conceptual purity of an idea or an ideal
tax structure, in order to achieve greater simplicity and administrative convenience? Again, it is worthy of repetition that the answer
should remain that only that much sacrifice should be made as is
absolutely necessary to make the proposal operationally feasible. At
opposing ends of the spectrum there is the inherent and inevitable
conflict between pure equity and pure simplicity. Pure equity would
necessitate the spreading out of an individual's income over his
entire tax life, with the consequent administrative problems for both
the Department of National Revenue and the taxpayer. Pure
simplicity, on the other hand, would dictate that any sum be taxed in
the year of receipt, with the resultant inequitable consequences. The
supra, note 67; G. Bale, British Transport Commission v. Gourley, Reconsidered

(1966), 44 Can. B. Rev. 66.
99. 3 Carter Report, supra, note 13 at 242.
100. Id. at 241.
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severity of this inequity was crystallized in Gourley' 0 1 , where, as a
consequence of the House of Lords' decision to consider tax factors
in the determination of quantum, the earnings component of the
award was reduced from £37,720 to £6695.
The total benefit derived by a taxpayer permitted to spread his
income over any period of time is the cumulative sum of two
separate and distinct influences: (i) mitigation of the rigour of
progressive tax rates, and (ii) the time value of money. The impact
of the progressive rate composition as embodied in s. 117 of the
Income Tax Act10 2 together with the provincial levies may be
demonstrated by a hypothetical case. Assume an individual receives
(a) $15,000 taxable income for each of five years, or (b) $75,000 in
the first year and zero dollars in the next four years. The resulting
tax liability of the individual taxpayer is shown below:
CASE A
Annual Income
Tax thereon:
On the first $14,000
On the next 1,000

$15,000
$3,415
350

(@ 35%)

Federal Tax Payable
Provincial Tax @ 36%

$3,765
1,355

Total Tax Payable per year
Total Tax Liability over five years

$5,120
$25,600

CASE B
Lump Sum Income
Tax thereon:
On the first $60,000
On the next $15,000

$21,795
7,050

(@ 47%)
Federal Tax Payable
Provincial Tax @ 36%

$28,845
10,384

Tax Liability over five years

$75,000

$39,229

101. [1956] A.C. 185; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 41; [195513 All E.R. 796 (H.L.).

102. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
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Here, two individual taxpayers in identical tax circumstances, with
identical total incomes over the same total time span, will have a
difference in their respective tax liabilities of $13,629 over the five
year period, with the difference being attributable entirely to the
progressive rate factor.
In addition, however, where a taxpayer is permitted to spread his
income received in any year over several future years, he receives
an incremental, but distinct, benefit from the time value of money.
Hence, if the individual in Case B were allowed to spread his
income of $75,000 received in the first year in the same manner as
the individual in Case A, he would receive an additional benefit
equivalent to the net after tax interest earned on the money invested
for the five year period.
Given this important disparity between the tax liability of those
taxpayers who receive their income over several taxation years and
those who might receive their income lump sum in one year, it
becomes imperative to design some system of taxation of the
earnings component of a personal injury award which will achieve
relative equity and at the same time maintain relative simplicity and
be administratively operational. It is worthy of note that this
inherent conflict between equity and simplicity is not limited by any
means to the area of damage awards compensating for lost earnings.
Indeed, identical problems arise whenever any form of bunched
income is received, which reflects an accretion to wealth
accumulated over several taxation years. As the Carter Commission
observed in this context:
...
in particular, we believe that substantial gifts and
inheritances, damage payments, and property gains realized or
deemed to have been realized on death or cessation of Canadian
03
residence all require relieving provisions ....
In the spirit of the preceding discussion outlining the desirability
of conceptualism reconciled with equity and simplicity, the
following specific proposals are submitted as a possible mode of
DNR taxation of the earnings component of damage awards. They
suggest the tenor of possible tax treatment, and are intended as
such, rather than as a definitive resolution of the problems outlined.
(1) The concept of income should be enlarged to bring within its
embrace that portion of the damage award which represents a
103. 3 Carter Report, supra, note 13 at 242.
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substitution of past and future earnings. This may be achieved in
one of two ways:
(a) by a shift in judicial attitude interpreting this segment of the
damage award as being encompassed within the concept of
income as that term is currently employed in the Income Tax
Act. Thus, the judicial interpretation of "income" and
"taxable income" as used in ss. 2, 5, 6, and 9 may be
expanded to encompass such payments. However, given the
dictum of the Jennings decision 10 4 , interpreting such
amounts as representing compensation of impaired earning
capacity, and the judicial role of the Supreme Court of
Canada as the ultimate arbiter of income tax appeals, such a
judicial shift represents at best an equivocal possibility.
(b)

by express statutory inclusion within the Income Tax Act, an
unequivocal assault may be launched on the problem, with
the attendant advantages of clarity and certainty. To achieve
this, s. 56 (1) may be expanded by insertion of a new
paragraph 56(1) (s) as follows:
Amounts to be included in incomefor year
56(1) [Current] Without restricting the generality of section 3,
there shall be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for
a taxation year,
(s)
Damage Payments [Proposed]
(i) All payments received by a taxpayer as a result of
settlement or litigation, representing that portion of a
damage award in a personal injury action which relates to
the compensation of past or future earnings, howsoever
computed, but so as to exclude any portion of the award
whether by settlement or litigation, that relates to
compensation for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of
life.10 5
(ii)

Proof of allocation between amounts to be included or
excluded may be made by extracts of any relevant

104. [1966] S.C.R. 532 at 545; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644 at 655; Judson J., adopting the
minority view of Gourley: ". . In a case of personal injuries, what the plaintiff
has lost is the whole or part, as the case may be, of his natural capital equipment
105. The tax treatment of medical expenses is considered infra in proposal #3. It is
submitted that existing provisions contained in s. 81 (1)(g.1), (g.2), (g.3) and 81
(4) be eliminated from the Act as being unduly preferential to infants. The concern,
as expressed by the Minister of Finance, for victims of thalidomide would appear
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documents, including judicial records used in, or resulting
from, the settlement of or litigation involving the personal
injury action. In the absence of any specific documentation,
the allocation made by the taxpayer between amounts to be
included or excluded by s. 56(1)(s)(i) must be reasonable.
The inclusion of a statutory amendment as outlined above will, in
addition to the obvious conceptual benefits, have associated with it
several ancillary pragmatic advantages: (a) since only amounts
actually received by the plaintiff would need to be included, it
would make moot the criticisms that ". . [tiax is not a charge on
income before it is received .... "1106, and would have no impact
on the taxpayer pending any appeal; (b) it would thwart any
possibility of double taxation, since the courts should no longer feel
the necessity to consider income tax factors in determining
quantum, in the knowledge that the plaintiffs tax liability would be
determined by statute10 7; (c) the courts would be relieved from any
overtones of uncertainty and speculations in regard to future tax
rates, personal exemptions, foreign income, and the individual
circumstances peculiar to every taxpayer 10 8; (d) at the same time the
dangers of prolonging trials to evaluate and consider such technical
arguments would no longer be necessary10 9; (e) finally, the
presence of such statutory provisions would serve as an inducement
to the judiciary, upon pressure by counsel, to clearly articulate the
characterization and computation of damage awards, with the
resulting benefits to future potential litigants in settling claims.
On a doctrinal level the advantages of statutory inclusion are even
more impressive. A persistent criticism of the Gourley doctrine has
misdirected in that a substantial portion of such awards would represent the loss of
amenities of life and would be exempt under the proposals suggested herein.
106. Comment of the English Law Reform Committee, supra, note 9 at4 and adopted
by Judson J. in Jennings, [19661 S.C.R. 532 at 543; 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644 at 655.
107. Dworkin, supra, note 10 at 323.
108. Id. at 324; "The Gourley calculation is inconvenient speculation and often
seriously wrong ....
Also dissent by Lord Keith of Avonholm in Gourley at 811
".. . To fix on an estimate of future taxation is impossible, and to assess them de
futuro on the basis of existing taxation without any knowledge of what the future
commitments and obligations and personal status of the injured person will be, or
would have been, seems to me unreal .... ." The force of these and similar
criticisms would be eliminated substantially.
109. The fear of complex tax issues were expressed inHighsheiv v. Kushto (1956),
134 N.E. 2d 555 at 556 (Ind. S.C.):
such...subject matter would involve intricate instructions on tax and non-tax
liabilities with all the regulations pertinent thereto. No Court could with any
certainty properly instruct a jury without a tax expert at its side ....

Taxation of Personal Injury Awards 431

been the inevitable by-product effect of providing the defendant
with a windfall related to the plaintiff's tax status. On the other
hand, the Jennings doctrine places the windfall on the plaintiff. As
Fleming has commented, "...
in effect, the pre-tax rule gives a
windfall to the plaintiff, the post-tax rule to the defendant. . ..
In light of the earlier doctrinal discussion on the purpose of damage
awards, the granting of a windfall to either the plaintiff or the
defendant erodes the fundamental theory of damages, and should,
where possible, be avoided. The treatment suggested above
succeeds in this objective by placing on the tortfeasor the full
burden of his negligence, while restoring the victim of the tort to his
pre-injury position. As a consequence, this proposal should
dissipate any fears of enrichment of either party to the action at the
expense of the other.
Further, the suggested statutory inclusion mitigates the public
policy exceptions taken by some critics. It has been argued that the
Gourley principle may result in a significant invasion of the privacy
of the plaintiff, in that accurate judicial consideration of tax factors
would necessitate the introduction of personal information into an
open court, which may prove distasteful to the plaintiff."1 Where,
however, the relevant amount is administered through the medium
of a taxing statute, the plaintiff retains his privacy without the
necessity of disclosure of personal financial information.
(2) Advocates of non-taxation of damage awards have long taken
the stance that the fact of escalating legal fees may in certain
instances be quite substantial, and have used this crutch to support
the view that the plaintiff has suffered enough by the payment of
these fees, and as such should not be further penalized by
deductions pertaining to income tax elements 112. Thus, in
McWeeney v. New York, NH & HRR Company, the Court alluded to
this rationale in the following terms:
Whatever the reasons of history or policy for the American
practice of generally not awarding attorneys' fees to the
110. Fleming, supra, note 67 at 317; see also a similar view by Bale, supra, note
98.
111. Dworkin, supra, note 10 at 326:
...The charge that the Gourley principle may result in a significant invasion of
the privacy of the plaintiff may sound sensational, but it is not necessarily
inaccurate ....
112. Fleming, supra, note 67 at 318 has expressed the fear that in some cases
"... a lion's share of the award isdevoured by the plaintiff's own lawyer ......
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successful party . . . we can hardly shut our eyes to this when
asked to require the jury to take another extrinisic factor into
account - particularly when we know that even court-prescribed
maximum scales of contingent fees, which have been attacked by
counsel as inadequate, provide either a sliding scale ranging from
50% down to 25%. 113
In part this rationale is peculiarly American, since in the United
States there is no indemnity for litigation costs. In contrast, the
English practice permits a successful plaintiff to recover from the
loser all reasonable costs, whereas the usual Canadian practice is to
allow partial indemnity for costs to the successful party. Upon any
view, however, it is difficult to conceive of a more diluted
justification for exemption of the entire damage award from
taxation, particularly in Canadian jurisdictions, which allow for
partial indemnity of costs.
Rather, the approach suggested herein is that legal fees incurred
in the course of litigation or settlement of personal injury claims
should be made specifically deductible by appropriate statutory
amendment. Several alternative routes are available to implement
this suggestion.
(a)

(b)

In light of s. 8(l)(a) of the Income Tax Act, which restricts
the employment expense deduction to 3 per cent of income
from employment, with an annual upper limit of $150, the
deduction of legal fees may be restricted in a similar manner
as being an expense incurred to recover lost employment
income. From any realistic standpoint, however, the $150
limitation on the deductibility of legal fees, while achieving
consistency, would be all but useless to the successful
plaintiff.
The $150 maximum could be raised in the case of
deductibility of legal fees in personal injury actions to an
equivalent of $150 times the number of years which the
damage award is intended to recompense. Hence, where the
award is for lost earnings for a period of ten years, the upper
limit would be $1,500; where the intended compensation
covers life, then presumably the same life expectancy
computation as that used at trial could be utilized. Once
again, this technique suffers from any realistic relationship
to current legal costs.

113. (1960),282F.2d34at38(U.S.C.A.;2dCir.).
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(c)

The entireproportionalamount expended in legal fees, less
any legal costs specifically recovered, i.e. proportionalnet
legal fees, could be made deductible from that portion of the
damage award being subjected to taxation. Proportional
deductibility may be supported on the premise that of the
total award only the portion relating to lost earnings is being
subjected to taxation, with the pain and suffering and loss of
amenities of life component being treated as exempt
receipts. The advantage of this approach is that it relates the
deductibility of an expense to the corresponding inclusion
of income, and is in closer harmony with the concept of net
income. Thus, where a plaintiff receives a total award of
$100,000 made up of:
Lost earnings
Medical expenses
Loss of amenities of life

$60,000
5,000
35,000

with attendant legal costs of $15,000 of which $5,000 is
recovered from the defendant as party and party costs, then
the deduction of legal fees would be restricted to a
maximum of $6,000. 114
(d) The entire amount of any net legal fees and disbursements
may be made deductible from that component of the total
damage award which is being subjected to taxation. In the
illustration above, the entire legal fees of $10,000 would be
deductible from the $60,000 lost earnings component. The
argument in favour of this approach is that the high cost of
legal costs should not unduly penalize the injured plaintiff.
While the selection of either (c) or (d) as the appropriate
technique for the allowance of deduction of legal fees is a matter of
relative equities, this writer favours the last-mentioned alternative
for the reason above-mentioned. To implement this suggestion, a
new paragraph 60(s) may be enacted to read as follows:
Other Deductions
60. [Current] There may be deducted in computing a taxpayer's

114. $ 60,000 = 60% x ($15,000 - 5,000) = $6,000.
$100,000

434 The Dalhousie Law Journal

income for a taxation year such of the following amounts as are
applicable:
(s) [Proposed] Such amounts paid by the taxpayer in respect of
legal fees and associated legal disbursements incurred in the
settlement or litigation of a personal injury action, less any
portion of legal fees and associated legal disbursements received
by the taxpayer from another party as a result of settlement or
litigation of such action, but so as not to exceed the amount
attributable to the compensation of past or future earnings,
included in income in s. 56(l)(s)(i).
Several observations in respect of the proposed statutory
amendment are in order. The proposal is intended to ameliorate
against the inclusion of the earnings component into income, so as
to generate taxation on some concept of net income, with a
matching of revenues and related expenses. As such the overall
deductibility is restricted to a maximum amount equal to the amount
included in income. Further, the deduction is restricted to the net
legal costs only in those situations where the taxpayer actually
receives his costs from the defendant. Where, as in certain
contingency fee arrangements, the recovered costs are retained by
legal counsel, the taxpayer's deduction would be the gross legal fees
and costs actuallypaid by him'1 5 .
(3) It is suggested that medical expenses be treated as a "wash"
transaction. Since proposed s. 56(1)(s)(i) makes no reference to
medical expenses recovered to be included in income, and existing
s.110(7) has the effect of prohibiting a deduction for medical
expenses where the taxpayer has been or is entitled to be
reimbursed, such-expenses incurred and reimbursed would in effect
"wash". This approach would accord with the concept of income,
since there would be no accretion to wealth. Further, if the taxpayer
has, prior to receiving his damage award by judgment or settlement,
deducted his medical expenses incurred under s.110(l)(c), the
Minister may obtain a waiver under s.152(4) for subsequent
reassessment.
The impact of the proposals to this juncture may be illustrated by
the use of hypothetical figures. Assume that Taxpayer A has
recovered a personal injury damage judgment of $100,000 plus
costs as follows:
115. It may be observed that the tortfeasor will not be able to deduct his legal fees
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Lost Earnings (Past)
Lost Earnings (Future)
Loss of Amenities of Life

$ 10,000
55,000
35,000
100,000

and has expended $15,000 in legal fees and costs, of which $5,000
were recovered from the defendant. Then he would be required to
include in income:
Lost Earnings (Past)
Lost Earnings (Future)

$10,000
55,000
$65,000

from which $65,000 he could deduct $10,000 net in legal fees and
costs, leaving him with net income of $55,000. How should the
$55,000 be taxed?
(4) As observed earlier, the existence of progressive tax rates
within the structure of the taxing statute, inserted as a vehicle of
equity, may prove instrumental in achieving inequitable and harsh
results. To mitigate against the rigour of such severe consequences,
which results ensue whenever bunched income is taxed lump-sum in
one taxation year, the taxpayer should be allowed to "forward
average" his residue of $55,000 by use of a forward-averaging
annuity contract. The forward-averaging provisions currently in the
Act are designed to permit individual taxpayers to spread their
income and the resultant tax liability over a number of future years.
The use of the forward-averaging mechanism to spread the
plaintiff's income over future years achieves at the same time the
desirable equitable consequence of permitting the taxpayer some
measure of relief, and is administratively feasible and simple in
view of the existing provisions in the Act. The mechanism for
deferral of certain forms of income (which list excludes damages) is
currently accomplished by the purchase of an "income averaging
annuity contract", pursuant to s.61(1)(a) and (4), whereby the
taxpayer purchases with a single payment within the taxation year or
within sixty days from the end of the taxation year, an annuity
contract from certain licensed institutions. 116
under this provision, since he will not have any offset income by virtue of the
restriction in the proposed subsection.
116. Income TaxAct. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 61(4)(b)(i).
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The essence of the forward-averaging provisions is that the
taxpayer may deduct from his income the premium required to
purchase the annuity contract, less the equivalent of one year's
annuity receipt expected from the contract. The annuity itself must
be for a guaranteed term or for the life of the individual, with or
without a guaranteed term1 17 , with the restrictive proviso that the
guaranteed term must not exceed fifteen years, or if the individual is
age 71 or more at the time the annuity payments commence, the
guaranteed term cannot extend beyond the year that the individual
will, if alive, become 85 years of age' 18 . Other restrictive
conditions require that payments under the contract to the taxpayer
must not commence later than ten months after the date that the
individual has made the single payment for the contract"1 9 , and the
annuity payments must be equal, and must be made annually or at
more frequent periodic intervals 12 0.
In the context of the previous illustration the plaintiff could, if the
suggested amendments were implemented, utilize his $55,000 to
purchase an annuity contract in accordance with the above specified
conditions. If he expected to receive annual payments of $5,300 for
fifteen years under the contract, he would be eligible to deduct
$49,700 from his income in the year the contract was purchased,
i.e. $55,000 single premium less $5,300 annual receipt expected.
The taxpayer could, of course, utilize any lesser sum of the total
$55,000 to purchase the annuity contract. The liability for tax is
then deferred; when the annuity payments are received by the
plaintiff under the income averaging annuity contract purchased for
forward-averaging, the payments would be included in computing
the income of the individual in the year of receipt' 21 . Further, the
deduction normally permitted for the capital element of an annuity
payment is expressly prohibited in the case of an annuity payment
under an income averaging annuity contract 122 , and this would
conceptually accord with the entire principal and interest elements
of the substitutional loss of earnings being taxed as and when
received by the plaintiff taxpayer.
Finally, it is suggested that in the selection of a discount rate by
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id., s. 61 (4)(b)(ii).
Id., s. 61 (4)(b)(ii)(A).
Id., s. 61 (4)(b)(ii).
Id., s. 61 (4) (b) (iii) (b).
Id., s. 56(1)(d).
Section 60 (a).
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the court for the purpose of determination of quantum, the pre-tax
discount rate is to be preferred over the after-tax. Selection of a
pre-tax discount rate circumvents the necessity of the court's
determining the appropriate tax rate to be applied to the plaintiff,
which may fluctuate over the time span of the injury period.
Further, application of a pre-tax discount rate permits the plaintiff to
decide whether he will pay tax lump sum on the damage award or
spread his award over a period of years through the mechanism of
an annuity contract. The determination of this choice will in turn
affect the effective marginal rate applicable, and should be left to
the recipient of the award, rather than to a judicial tribunal.
Implementation of the suggested proposal could conveniently be
achieved by statutory expansion of existing s.61 by the insertion of a
new paragraph s.61(2)(h), structured to meet the stated objectives:
61 ....
(2)....
(h). [Proposed] Any amount included in computing the
individual's income for the year by virtue of s.56(1)(s)(i), less
any amounts deducted from income under s.60(s) ...
V. Conclusion
The tenor of this paper has hinted at the vacuum of conceptualism in
the evaluation of tax consequences on personal injury awards. Lord
Atkin's comment made in 1925 that the law of damages still awaits
a scientific statement and that this branch of the law is less guided
by authority laying down definite principles than any other branch is
probably equally applicable today. 1 23 Further, it is submitted that
the absence of conceptualism in the area of damages is shadowed by
the void of conceptual integration of the rationale underlying the
theory of income and the objectives of a tax structure. As a
consequence of this neglect, these legal compartments have, in the
absence of integration, developed at tangents within a supposedly
unified legal system.
The proposals submitted in this paper have endeavoured to
balance the conceptual necessity of subjecting the earnings
component of damage awards to taxation, with the desire to devise a
scheme which would be administratively efficient and simple and
still retain an equitable flavour. A decision to tax the earnings
123. The Susquehanna, [1925] P.196 at 210 (C.A.).
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component of such awards would reconcile and integrate the
concept of income as an accretion to wealth, with the underlying
objective of compensation in assessing damages. Given the decision
to tax, of the two alternatives available, taxation through the
medium of the Income Tax Act would prove superior on both
doctrinal and pragmatic levels to the alternative of judicial
consideration of tax factors in assessing quantum.
Statutory taxation and administration by the DNR removes at
once the doctrinal hurdle of choosing between enriching the
defendant or the plaintiff. Under this method neither party is
enriched at the expense of the other. Rather, the defendant pays his
full quota of compensation, while the plaintiff proceeds in his usual
relationship with the taxing authorities. At the same time all issues
of remoteness, res inter alios acta, and the potential for invasion of
fiscal privacy become moot. On a pragmatic level, the suggested
proposals prove advantageous. They permit the plaintiff to retain a
measure of flexibility in arranging his financial affairs, avoid any
delay and the associated incremental costs of extended trials, and
provide for a more comprehensive consideration of the plaintiff's
personal circumstances, exemptions, personal deductions, foreign
income, and the like.
Administratively the choice of statutory taxation provides a
convenient and relatively simple mechanism, with the proposals
premised on the utilization of existing provisions of the Act with
minor modifications. Further, and perhaps of pre-eminent importance, the proposals facilitate taxation of the plaintiff on some
relatively equitable basis, in that they permit of income spreading
over several years and the deduction of legal costs. Finally, the
suggested proposals permit the taxpayer to maintain flexibility in
planning his affairs, by extending the use of forward averaging
contracts.
While this paper has confined itself to the narrow issue of the tax
treatment of damage awards in personal injury cases, the underlying
approach is of wider application. Notwithstanding the desirability
and importance of conceptualism and integration of legal
sub-systems, some sacrifice of these ideals to the pragmatic
pressures of daily administration is inevitable. That such sacrifices
should be restricted to the minimum essential for the implementation of a conceptually integrated rationale, is of general application
to other areas of the law. This balancing qf conceptualism against
pragmatism is a task familiar to the judicial and legislative process
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and assumes increasing importance in a complex interactive society.
In the neglect of these principles lies the germ of discord and the
potential for pragmatism by default. The proposals outlined in this
paper are not intended as exhaustive of all possible alternatives, and
do not lay claim to any such pretence. In any balancing process
requiring a compromise of conflicting considerations, value
judgments and ideological influences are ever present. Rather, the
proposals are intended to furnish a tenor for any future review of the
problems discussed, and should be regarded as merely directional in
the search for a resolution.

